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Reconsidering NEPA
BRIGHAM DANIELS,* ANDREW P. FOLLETT,** JAMES SALZMAN***
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) ushered in the modern era of
environmental law. Thanks to its environmental impact statement (EIS) provision, it
remains, by far, the most litigated environmental statute. Many administrations have
sought to weaken the law. The Trump administration, for example, put into place
regulations that strictly limit the EIS process, which the Biden administration seems
poised to roll back. For the most part, however, NEPA has shown remarkable staying
power and resilience since its passage just over fifty years ago. As a result, its
legislative history remains relevant. But the accepted history of NEPA is deeply
flawed.
By bringing the history to light, this Article makes three contributions. First,
relying on both original primary sources and a thorough review of the literature, we
provide a nuanced and engaging history of the EIS provision, correcting common
misconceptions of the accepted story. Second, we show why understanding this more
accurate history of the Act’s key provision can rebut major threats to NEPA and the
regulations that govern it, such as those introduced during the Trump
administration. Third, our granular history of NEPA provides an ideal experiment
to test the accuracy of traditional canons of legislative history. We find that most
canons fail to recognize the most critical aspects of NEPA’s history. Positive
political theory–derived canons, on the other hand, most accurately capture the
actual legislative history.
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INTRODUCTION
Signed into law just over fifty years ago, the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)1 was the first modern environmental statute2 and remains among the most
important. Its core requirement is simple—an environmental impact statement (EIS)
must be prepared for major federal actions significantly affecting the human
environment.3 NEPA has become the legal tool of choice in a wide range of
environmental issues4—indeed, it has resulted in more litigation than all other
environmental laws combined. Widely admired, NEPA has served as the model for
similar laws in more than 180 jurisdictions worldwide.5
Near the end of its term, the Trump administration set its sights on this
foundational Act, proposing regulations intended to weaken significantly the
environmental impact analysis requirement through restrictive page limits and time
frames. While the Biden administration has made reversal of these and other NEPA
changes an early priority,6 it will take some time before the Biden administration can
sort through all the issues the changes adopted by the Trump administration. Even
once this is accomplished, there is no reason to assume a future like-minded
administration will not seek identical or even more far-reaching changes.
Additionally, in facilitating the development of new energy or infrastructure projects,
the Biden administration might keep streamlining the EIS on the table, at least in
part. In providing thorough research to rebut too much deregulation in the future
(while providing boundaries for positive streamlining by more environmentally
friendly administrations), this Article focuses closely on the boundaries and meaning
of NEPA’s text and legislative history, showing that it has been misunderstood in
important respects.

1. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
2. DAVID M. DRIESEN, ROBERT W. ADLER & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 121 (2d ed. 2011); JAMES RASBAND, JAMES
SALZMAN, MARK SQUILLACE & SAM KALEN, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 291 (3d
ed. 2016); J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA B. KLASS, THE
PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 406 (3d ed. 2014); JAMES SALZMAN &
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 321 (3d ed. 2010); Michael B.
Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 NAT. RES. &
ENV’T 20 (2008).
3. ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE
9 (1997); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 857 (6th ed. 2009);
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 801–09 (2d ed. 1994); PHILIP WEINBERG &
KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 56 (1998); H. Paul Friesema & Paul
J. Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16
NAT. RESOURCES J. 339 (1976).
4. See ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PARADOX (4th ed. 2004).
5. Tseming Yang, The Emergence of the Environmental Impact Assessment Duty as a
Global Legal Norm and General Principle of Law, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 526 (2019) (“[A]t
least 183 jurisdictions have now adopted the EIA duty as part of their environmental
governance system.”).
6. 86 Fed. Reg. 7037–43 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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As interpreted in early judicial decisions, NEPA’s novel “action-forcing” mandate
made agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of their projects.7
It gave citizens and public interest groups an unprecedented foothold in
administrative decision making, in many ways establishing what we now call
environmental law. Unlike every other modern environmental law, NEPA has shown
a remarkable path dependency. Despite attacks for half a century through nine
administrations, the Act and the regulations that govern it remain largely unchanged,
particularly after the Biden administration is able to walk back the most problematic
aspects of the administrative rulemaking of the Trump administration. Putting aside
rulemakings, no Congress has changed the original enactment that passed through
Congress in 1969. Thus, understanding its legislative history is especially important
to understanding its meaning today.
The reported and generally accepted history of NEPA is well known and
straightforward8: responding to public pressure from the growing environmental
movement and eyeing a 1972 presidential campaign, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson
masterfully guided the legislation through his Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.
He had to face down opposition by the Nixon administration and the obstinate
Senator Ed Muskie, who sought to defend his environmental mantle in Congress and
extend his committee’s jurisdiction. Jackson was closely assisted by political
scientist Lynton K. Caldwell, on leave from Indiana University, who spontaneously
proposed the environmental impact statement and insisted on its inclusion in the Act
during hearings.9
Thorough original historical research and interviews with participants make clear
that this widely accepted story is deeply inaccurate. The EIS did not originate
spontaneously. There had been serious discussion of similar strategies to force
agency action both in and outside of Congress for almost a full decade before Jackson
and Caldwell “invented” the policy tool.10 Second, the critical language requiring the

7. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
8. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (2013); MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A.
SMITH, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION,
LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE, AND EXECUTIVE NEGLECT (2008); RICHARD A. LIROFF, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976); A. Dan
Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the National Environmental Policy
Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77 (Richard J.
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005); Oliver A. Houck, Is That All? A Review of The
National Environmental Policy Act, an Agenda for the Future, 11 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F.
173, 174 (2000); Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENV’T
L. & POL’Y F. 113, 139 (2010); Richard A. Liroff, NEPA—Where Have We Been and Where
Are We Going?, 46 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 154, 154–55 (1980).
9. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2282 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs., 89th
Cong. 59 (1966); Hearing on S. 239 & S. 1415 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affs., 87th Cong. 32–33 (1961); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., REVIEWS OF NATIONAL
SCIENCE POLICIES: THE UNITED STATES 295–96 (1968); U.S. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFF. OF SCI. & TECH., FED. COUNCIL FOR SCI. & TECH., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON
NATURAL RESOURCES 16 (1963). Additionally, at the time of NEPA’s passage, a series of other
bills were in play that sought to force action and deliver on a national environmental policy,
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“detailed statements” that would become the EIS was inserted into the draft law not
by Jackson, but by the Committee on Environment and Public Works and its staff
following aggressive intervention by Senator Muskie.11 Without the bitter
competition between Muskie and Jackson, and the intervention of the Public Works
Committee, NEPA would have likely emerged as a forgettable administrative nudge,
simply requiring agencies to report “findings” of intended impacts. Rather than the
villainous foil to Jackson’s heroic leadership, Muskie was equally critical in crafting
NEPA as it exists today.
These two stories—the mythic and the accurate—lend themselves to
substantively different readings of Section 102 by attributing key concepts to
different legislative players with very different intents and purposes. Recognizing
the correct story may make a substantial difference to whether NEPA stands or falls
in the face of current and future challenges.
This Article makes three important contributions—two to substance and one to
theory. First, it sets the historical record straight. In providing a more accurate and
nuanced history of NEPA’s environmental impact statement, this Article relies on
extensive and previously unpublished primary sources, including original interviews,
historical documents, unpublished scholarship, and never-before-reported, secretly
recorded transcriptions of President Nixon’s conversations about NEPA. What
emerges is a more complete cast of actors and a fuller picture of legislative intent.
We find the heroic story of Jackson and Caldwell displaced by a more accurate
history of NEPA marked by conflict, bargaining, and compromise.
Second, taking advantage of granular knowledge of how NEPA came to be,12 this
Article engages in the larger debate over various canons of statutory interpretation
and their value. Knowing the full history of NEPA provides a rare opportunity to test
traditional canons’ ability to reconstruct the core aspects of a law’s legislative
history. We find that traditional canons employed by the judiciary in its quest to
understand NEPA13 would fail to parse out the full story of Section 102 by
emphasizing red herrings and drawing out the “told” but grossly oversimplified story.
In contrast, we find McNollgast’s positive political “veto gates” canons and their
application to NEPA to be remarkably useful.14 Positive canons, we argue, should be

some through even more dramatic mandates. A more detailed history of environmental impact
analysis during this era is the subject of forthcoming research by the authors.
11. See infra Section II.B.
12. Such an opportunity is largely a byproduct of NEPA’s historic significance—not all
acts of Congress are so significant that everyone involved, down to staff, spend the rest of their
lives discussing and lecturing on it, of course.
13. See infra note 181.
14. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 31 (1994) [hereinafter Legislative Intent]; see also
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); McNollgast, Positive and
Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative
Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 307 (1990); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1438–39 (2003). While
McNollgast analyzed the applicability of the positive political theory to NEPA’s Section 103,
in this Article, we consider the larger and more weighty bargains which remade Section 102.
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employed in future controversies regarding NEPA regulations on the meaning and
intent of Section 102. Understanding NEPA’s true story is thus important not only
for environmental legal history and the preservation of the EIS, but also to the general
discussion over the use of extrinsic sources.
Third, and most importantly, this Article argues that the history and interpretive
methods we put forward may be the legally most effective defense of environmental
impact statements against improper regulatory rollbacks under future hostile
administrations—rather than being backward-oriented, this Article considers the
future vitality and effectiveness of NEPA.
We proceed in three parts. Part I introduces the proposed Trump regulations in a
historical context. We outline an oftentimes bipartisan pattern of proposed rollbacks
to the environmental impact statement and explore the ways in which the Trump
proposal was qualitatively different and, we argue, more dangerous to the Act and its
purposes than previous proposals.
Part II explores the legislative history of NEPA and considers the atmosphere of
competition and conflict in which the bill came to be. We describe its passage
through the Senate without a “detailed statements” provision and the irregular means
by which the bill was amended and remade off the record. We show that, barring
such conflict, NEPA would have been a trivial law, long forgotten by now.
Part III assesses how well the leading canons of statutory interpretation serve to
explain NEPA’s legislative history and construct its legislative intent and purpose.
Unlike McNollgast’s “veto gates” canons, most of the traditionally employed canons
fare poorly, suggesting the need for a more critical assessment of their application
by the judiciary. In light of the proposed Trump regulations, we discuss the potential
ramifications of the legislative history and use of different canons as it applies to the
future of NEPA. If the same old approach to NEPA’s legislative history is taken, the
EIS may not survive future administration assaults.
I. THE CAMPAIGN TO REMAKE NEPA
Fifty years ago, no one observing NEPA’s passage would have guessed that it
would grow into an environmental behemoth. To most observers in Congress, NEPA
was regarded as a general policy statement or even an antipollution measure. As one
scholar later noted,
one of two Senate staff members who drafted the initial version of
Section 102, Daniel Dreyfus, noted that “there wasn’t much wrangling
in the [conference] committee” over the language of Section 102, and
although the staff attempted to generate public interest in the provisions,
there was a “gross lack of appreciation for the significance of that
language.”15

15. Claude E. Barfield & Richard Corrigan, White House Seeks to Restrict Scope of
Environment Law, 4 NAT’L J. 336, 340 (1972), cited in Hanna J. Cortner, A Case Analysis of
Policy Implementation: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RES. J. 323,
330 (1976).
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Discussion of what is now the most controversial aspect of the bill, the EISdemanding Section 102, hardly appeared in the Senate report.16
Instead, the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), created by NEPA in the
Executive Office of the President, was assumed to be the most significant outcome
of the statute.17 Writing to bill sponsor Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Nixon described
NEPA as the “Council on Environmental Quality” bill.18 No one else in the Executive
branch seemed to have regarded NEPA as anything more, either. As John Whitaker,
Nixon’s chief environmental policy adviser, later commented,
NEPA seemed, I think, to a number of people, to be almost a policy
statement and without teeth . . . . Did it have a legal implication, and the
government would end up being sued and this would be kind of a cottage
industry for the lawyers and this was really going to change the world?
Maybe somebody in OMB knew. I certainly didn't know. The President
didn't know. John Ehrlichman didn’t know.19
Not seeing any threat posed by the bill, Nixon used its signing ceremony to
announce a major push for environmental legislation and glean some of the
spotlight.20 White House staff, led by John Ehrlichman and John Whitaker, had
constructed a set of broad environmental protection proposals that Nixon intended to
unveil at his State of the Union Address at the end of January 1970. Signing NEPA
would signal that more was yet to come,21 as Nixon stated:
It is particularly fitting that my first official act in this new decade is to
approve the National Environmental Policy Act . . . . By my participation
in these efforts I have become further convinced that the 1970s
absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the past by

16. See S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8 (1969).
17. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 1–3.
18. Letter from President Richard Nixon to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (Jan. 19, 1970)
(unpublished letter on file with the Indiana Law Journal). The White House and others seem
to have interpreted NEPA to be significant first and foremost for Title II. Letter from Harold
LeVander, Governor of Minnesota, to President Richard Nixon (Jan. 2, 1970) (unpublished
letter on file with the Indiana Law Journal); Memorandum from Wilfred H. Rommel,
Assistant Dir. for Legis. Reference, to President Richard Nixon (Dec. 30, 1969) (unpublished
letter on file with the Indiana Law Journal). This misunderstanding was critical to the bill’s
passage. As one staff aide later admitted, “If Congress had appreciated what the law would
do, it would not have passed. They would have seen it as screwing public works . . . . If
Congress had known what it was doing, it would not have passed the law.” LIROFF, supra note
8, at 35.
19. Interview by Frederick J. Graboske & Raymond H. Geselbrach with John C.
Whitaker, former White House Domestic Council member, at the Nat’l Archives (Dec. 30,
1987). Whitaker continues, “But yes, Charlie, there was a lot of griping. The Secretary of
Commerce would call every couple of days and say the world is falling apart and this thing
was just going to ruin the world. And we didn't know how to write an environmental impact
statement very well. We got sued a lot and we lost a lot.” Id.
20. The political pressure that led him to do this is discussed below. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
21. See PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 858.
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reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters and our living environment. It
is literally now or never. . . . We are determined that the decade of the
70's will be known as the time when this country regained a productive
harmony between man and nature.22
Nixon’s strong support for harmony between man and nature, though, soon
became discordant thanks to the actions of D.C. Circuit Judge Skelly Wright and a
seemingly obscure case about the process of licensing nuclear reactors. Judge
Wright’s opinion in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission interpreted NEPA’s requirement for a “detailed
statement”23 in a manner that the White House had never imagined. According to the
court, agencies must provide “evidence that the mandated decision-making process
has in fact taken place and, most importantly, allows those removed from the initial
process to evaluate and balance the factors on their own.”24
With a clear mandate for agencies from the D.C. Circuit’s reading of NEPA that
required agencies to examine environmental impacts to the fullest extent possible (or
face lawsuits if they did not), NEPA’s power quickly became apparent. As White
House adviser John Whitaker recalled,
[T]here was a lot of griping. The Secretary of Commerce would call
every couple of days and say the world is falling apart and this thing was
just going to ruin the world. And we didn’t know how to write an
environmental impact statement very well. We got sued a lot and we lost
a lot. The judge saying the facts we had unearthed when writing the
environmental statement were not adequate to make a decision whether
you should or should not go forward with a certain development
project.25
Even before Calvert Cliffs was decided, Nixon was beginning to sour. NEPA drew
special criticism from Nixon during this period:
We get an environmental impact statement on the [proposed] Alaskan
pipeline, but nowhere in the law does it require an economic impact
statement to show what the plusses would be of that particular one. So

22. Statement of President Richard Nixon at the Signing of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (Jan. 1, 1970) (unpublished press release on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
23. 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 1114. The opinion then goes on to refine what NEPA’s action-forcing language
of “detailed statement” means: “Of course, all of these Section 102 duties are qualified by the
phrase ‘to the fullest extent possible.’ We must stress as forcefully as possible that this
language does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's
procedural requirements somehow ‘discretionary.’ Congress did not intend the Act to be such
a paper tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration ‘to the fullest extent
possible’ sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced
by the reviewing courts.” Id.
25. Patricia Limerick, Inside Interior Interview with John C. Whitaker, CTR. AM. WEST
(Nov. 19, 2003), https://www.centerwest.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/whitaker.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6S7-MRKF].
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you get all these impact statements that point out just the horror stories,
but no statement required on a formal basis that says, “Here’s the reasons
that dictate in favor of building the darn thing . . . . I’ve got [Attorney
General John Mitchell] working on it now, and he’s being persuasive,
trying to get reasonable and just go through with it. Because the pipeline
should be built, it should be built through Alaska, not through Canada.
Period. That’s all. That’s all . . . . [The people opposing it] are wild. Say
we’re going to get skin cancer. (laughter). Skin cancer!”26
After his reelection in 1972, Nixon lost all appetite to push environmental bills
and began to even walk back some of his own environmental measures. Despite the
increasing demands of Watergate, Nixon’s staff developed a proposal to suspend
NEPA for five years.27 In one meeting, Whitaker reminded Nixon of his order that
his staff “prepare for you as soon as possible legislation which would remove all
environmental roadblocks to energy production and supply by cancelling
environmental inhibitions for the next few years.”28
Opposition to NEPA started emerging from Congress, as well. Indeed, in 1972,
environmental groups created a coalition called “Save NEPA” to mobilize against
weakening legislation. Just two years after the law’s passage, alarmed by the Calvert
Cliffs opinion and agency defeat after defeat to NEPA litigants, the landscape had
fundamentally changed. Gone was the consensus support for harmony between man
and environment or an overarching government commitment to the environment. A
new era emerged that continues through today—periodic strong opposition to NEPA
from the White House and Congress alike.29 Reining in NEPA is not a partisan issue
in Congress, either. Congress time and again has exempted NEPA from slowing
down border walls, grazing programs on federal lands, and transport projects, under
both Democratic and Republican control.30 Even Scoop Jackson, the mythic creator
of NEPA, turned against his own statute. During the OPEC oil crisis in the 1970s, he
favored limiting NEPA challenges in order to increase production through the TransAlaska Pipeline.31
Initiatives to reform or streamline NEPA (whether to facilitate or hamper
environmental protections) have become routine and are bound to continue into
future administrations. President George W. Bush created a task force charged with
“modernizing NEPA implementation.”32 President Trump issued a series of

26. Audiotape: Nixon White House Tapes, Conversation with Peter H. Dominick & Clark
MacGregor, Tape 471(a) (Mar. 24, 1971) (available at the Nixon Presidential Library).
27. Memorandum from Ken Cole, Aide, to President Richard Nixon (Feb. 27, 1974)
(unpublished memorandum on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
28. Id.
29. Edmund S. Muskie & Eliot R. Cutler, A National Environment Policy: Now You See
It, Now You Don't, 25 ME. L. REV. 163, 164 (1973) (“No longer is NEPA the litmus test of
environmental concern which it once was. Everyone is confused, and the confusion is
understandable when an observer tries to bring order out of the chaotic state of federal
environmental law.”).
30. Sam Kalen, NEPA’s Trajectory: Our Waning Environmental Charter from Nixon to
Trump?, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10398, 10404 (2020).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 10405.
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executive orders calling for expedited environmental reviews for high-priority
infrastructure and energy independence projects, among others.33 But efforts to
weaken NEPA have not only come from Republican administrations. In 2009,
Congress passed President Obama’s stimulus package that provided for expedited
NEPA review as well as similar exceptions in his law for freight and large-scale
projects.34
Despite executive orders from the White House and congressional legislation
calling for expedited review or even excluding particular types of projects from
NEPA’s reach, an important fact stands out. NEPA, itself, has not been significantly
amended.35 The statute has shown remarkable resilience. This stands in stark contrast
to every other major environmental law. It’s not that Congress hasn’t tried. Proposed
bills gutting NEPA are commonplace.36 But they have not gained enough support for
passage.
While over the years many have argued that NEPA should be read to have
substantive as well as procedural requirements,37 attempts to get courts to follow
along have been fruitless—courts have only recognized NEPA’s procedural EIS

33. Id. at 10406–07.
34. Id. at 10405.
35. LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION CRS-6 n.1 (2005) (“NEPA was amended
by P.L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, regarding how CEQ may spend appropriated funds; P.L. 94-83,
August 9, 1975, specifying parameters under which states may prepare an EIS; and P.L. 97258, § 4(b), September 13, 1982, regarding budget and accounting procedures.”).
36. See generally Kalen, supra note 30.
37. Lynton K. Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: Retrospect and
Prospect, 6 ENV’T L. REP. 50030, 50032–33 (1976); Lynton K. Caldwell, Environmental
Impact Analysis (EIA): Origins, Evolution, and Future Directions, 6:3–4 IMPACT ASSESSMENT
75, 78 (1988); ZYGMUNT PLATER, ROBERT ABRAMS, ROBERT GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING,
DAVID WIRTH & NOAH HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY
320–323 (5th ed. 2016); Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENV’T L.
533, 534–36 (1990); Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy Act:
Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L.
275, 281–282 (1997); Bernard S. Cohen & Jacqueline Manney Warren, Judicial Recognition
of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 685, 704 (1972); L.K. Caldwell, Implementing NEPA: A Non-technical
Political Task, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 25, 35
(Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997); ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 1–3 (positing that the
legislative history of the Act is taken up with issues of study, research, and institutional
reorganization); ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 27 (2008). Mourning a “substantive” NEPA is something of a ritual in the
environmental legal literature. See generally Roger M. Leed, The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969: Is the Fact of Compliance a Procedural or Substantive Question, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 303, 325 (1975); Kalen, supra note 8; David G. Burleson, NEPA at 21: Over the
Hill Already?, 24:3 AKRON L. REV. 623 (1991); Lynton K. Caldwell, Is NEPA Inherently SelfDefeating?, 9 ENV’T L. REP. 50001 (1979); Weiland, supra, at 286–290; Sam Kalen, The
Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the Nation’s Environmental Policy, 33 WM.
& MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 483 (2009); LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 36 (1998).
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requirement.38 NEPA does not require federal agencies to choose environmentally
friendly projects. However, they only must look before they leap and disclose project
impacts and disclose certain information about reasonable project alternatives and
their environmental impacts.
Thus, the meaning of NEPA depends very much on how hard agencies look, in
addition to how much leverage outsiders—including the public—have to scrutinize
the information that is disclosed. The Trump administration sought to undercut this.39
The regulations put in place at the tail-end of Trump’s presidency impose an
arbitrary, unrealistic page limit to constrict information made public. It caps most
EISs to 150 pages, only allowing exceptions in certain narrow circumstances.40
Moreover, unless a narrow exemption were met, the regulations also caps the time
an agency can devote to two years (from the time an agency publishes notice to
complete an EIS to the time it is finalized with a record of decision).41 Without
context, these numbers may not mean very much. To understand the scope of these
changes, however, and how fundamentally they might affect EISs, consider the data
points that the administration itself volunteered:
[A]cross all Federal agencies, draft EISs [finalized between January 1,
2013, and December 31, 2017] averaged 586 pages in total, with a
median document length of 403 pages. One quarter of the draft EISs were
288 pages or shorter, and one quarter were 630 pages or longer. For final
EISs, the mean document length was 669 pages, and the median
document length was 445 pages. One quarter of the final EISs were 299
pages or shorter, and one quarter were 729 pages or longer. On average,
the change in document length from draft EIS to final EIS was an
additional 83 pages or a 14 percent increase. With respect to final EISs,
CEQ found that approximately 7 percent were 150 pages or shorter, and
25 percent were 300 pages or shorter.42
The Trump administration’s proposed time limit was in stark contrast with the
time actually taken on EISs: “[A]cross the Federal Government, the average time for

38. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004) (citing Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Valley, 490 U.S. 332, 349–50 (1989)); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth
significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially
procedural.”).
39. Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1684 (Jan. 10, 2020); see also COUNCIL ON ENV’T
QUALITY, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP IS COMMITTED TO MODERNIZING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND PAVING THE WAY FOR VITAL INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-jtrump-committed-modernizing-environmental-policies-paving-way-vital-infrastructureimprovements/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wh
[https://perma.cc/74TJ-KVUW].
40. Update to the Regulations, supra note 39 at 1700–02 (discussing proposed changes to
40 C.F.R. § 1502.7).
41. Id. at 1699–1700 (discussing proposed changes to 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8).
42. Id. at 1688.

2021]

RECONSIDERING NEPA

875

completion of an EIS and issuance of a ROD was over 4.5 years and the median was
3.6 years. One quarter of the EISs took less than 2.2 years, and one quarter of the
EISs took more than 6 years.”43
The changes have thrown a major wrench in EIS preparation (and will continue
to do so as long as they are on the books), changing common practice since the
1970s.44 The great majority of EISs, under these rules, will have to be smaller than
93% of all detailed statements published in the greater part of the last decade and
take less time to prepare than nearly 75%.
At least on case challenging these rules promulgated by the Trump administration
has been allowed to proceed under the Biden administration,45 and regardless, the
Biden administration may want to keep at least portions of Trump’s changes on the
table, at least for projects it deems environmentally critical (like the building of green
infrastructure). Whether it is a court confronting the changes the Trump
administration introduced through rulemaking or the Biden administration (or any
other future administration) trying to figure out what sorts of changes are
permissible, a proper understanding of NEPA’s legislative history is important. As
for the Trump changes, these requirements that limit the reach of NEPA review are
unreasonable. The proposed page limits frustrate the question of how detailed is
“detailed”? Similarly, the time limits restrict how much agencies can consider,
question, and suggest new lines of inquiry (such as unexplored alternatives derived
from comment periods). Finally, how much information is volunteered to the public
would be significantly constrained.
For the first time in nearly a half century, NEPA faces a serious challenge to the
EIS. Put simply, as long as the changes Trump introduced remain on the books,
NEPA is greatly weakened, and weakened in ways that contradict the meaning of the
statute that an accurate view of the legislative history makes clear.
While the most problematic parts of the Trump changes will likely to be reversed
by the Biden administration, it will take some time. Additionally, the Trump
regulations provide a roadmap for future administrations seeking to continue the
strategy of deregulation and environmental rollback. Should such regulations come
into force, the ensuing litigation will need to ask the same question that Calvert Cliffs
asked: What is meant by detailed statement? Similarly, streamlining NEPA to
facilitate a rapid energy transition or the development of a green economy under a
more environmentally minded administration might force us to ask the same
question. In answering that question, a reviewing court should follow the lead of
Judge Wright in Calvert Cliffs—rely on the legislative history of NEPA to parse the
meaning of the statute. The problem is that the commonly understood history of the
action-forcing provision of the detailed statement is wrong.

43. Id. at 1687.
44. Id. at 1684.
45. Rachel Frazin, Judge Rejects Biden Request for Delay in Trump Environmental
Rollback Case, HILL (Feb. 22, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/539859federal-judge-rejects-biden-request-to-pause-case-over-trump [https://
perma.cc/UVT4-X4KW].
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II. LEGISLATING NEPA
The accepted history of NEPA is heroic. In its simplest form, it is the story of
Lynton Caldwell who, in a flash of policy genius, had the idea to insert an actionforcing mechanism into NEPA—the EIS. In some versions, Caldwell developed the
idea over a period of years. In more hagiographic tellings, the idea was spontaneous,
coming “to Caldwell as a young man while he was gazing at a sunset over the harbor
of Hong Kong.”46 Caldwell’s testimony before the Senate on April 16, 1969, is most
often highlighted as the singular creation moment. Caldwell told the Committee:
[I]t seems to me, that the Congress indeed has a responsibility . . . and
could enunciate [a national environmental] policy. But beyond this, I
would urge that in the shaping of such policy, it have an action-forcing,
operational aspect. When we speak of policy we ought to think of a
statement which is so written that it is capable of implementation; that it
is not merely a statement of things hoped for . . . but that it is a statement
which will compel or reinforce or assist . . . the executive agencies . . .
.47
Caldwell no doubt played a part in highlighting his singular contribution to NEPA
(history, after all, is written by the victors), but the idea of what would become
NEPA’s Section 102, which mandates EISs, has deeper roots than a single

46. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental
Law: The Who's, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 12 (1999) (“Perhaps the grandest ‘Aha!’ moment in
the history of environmental law was Lynton Caldwell's idea to insert an action-forcing
mechanism into NEPA. . . . It came to Caldwell as a young man while he was gazing at a
sunset over the harbor in Hong Kong.”). Other Caldwell-centric versions of this story exist as
well. See, e.g., Kalen, supra note 8, at 139; CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 48; LINDSTROM &
SMITH, supra note 8, at 36.
47. National Environmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the
S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs., 91st Cong. 116 (1969) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1075].
Caldwell also credits himself with originating environmental impact analysis as action-forcing
in an unpublished 1964 paper, in which he wrote that “some instrumental means are . . . needed
to improve the quality of decision making on environmental and ecological matters, and which
can be successfully applied under conditions wherein ecological sophistication is minimal.”
Caldwell, Implementing NEPA, supra note 37, at 61; Terence T. Finn, Conflict and
Compromise: Congress Makes A Law, The Passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
305 (Nov. 16, 1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (ProQuest) (“Looking back
in 1971 Caldwell pointed to his memoranda . . . as the genesis of the National Environmental
Policy Act's requirement for a detailed statement on the environmental impact of proposed
actions.”). Caldwell later conceded somewhat. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Implementing Policy
Through Procedure: Impact Assessment and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
in ENVIRONMENTAL METHODS REVIEW: RETOOLING IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEW
CENTURY 1, 9–10 (Alan L. Porter & John J. Fittipaldi eds., 1998). Responding to Caldwell,
Senator Jackson continued: “I am wondering if we might not broaden the policy provision in
the bill so as to lay down a general requirement that would be applicable to all agencies that
have responsibilities that affect the environment rather than trying to go through agency by
agency.” Hearing on S. 1075, supra, at 116–117. The interchange between the two, however,
was effectively “scripted.” Kalen, supra note 8, at 141.
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congressional hearing or Hong Kong sunset, and in many ways was thrusted upon
Jackson rather than developed by him or Caldwell.
While a much longer history could be provided,48 what would become NEPA
began to take its final form in 1968, when Senator Jackson and other congressional
colleagues49 organized and held on July 17, 1968, a “Joint House-Senate Colloquium
to Discuss a National Policy for the Environment.”50 During the Colloquium, Interior
Secretary and conservation thought leader Stewart Udall argued for an action-forcing
mechanism.51 Recognizing that policy statements alone will not “stop the inexorable
highway construction, the obnoxious boom of supersonic aircraft, the wrongheaded
dam building, or the pernicious concept of calculated obsolescence that fouls our
countryside,”52 he said, harmful activities will be mitigated only when Congress
gives life to policy statements “through new laws and new policies that reject the old
ways. For example, we must be willing to require that the nature and potential of new
goods and services be examined for their impact on man and nature before, not after,
their first use.”53 He did not use the term “environmental impact statement,” but the
conceptual framework was the same. Rather than create a singular agency or
oversight body, he argued that “[e]ach agency should designate responsible officials
and establish environmental checkpoints to be sure they have properly assessed this
impact.”54

48. See supra note 10.
49. Senator Jackson reportedly agreed to the Colloquium only after being “prodded by
Van Ness” and realizing that such a colloquium might defuse pressure for a Joint Committee
on the environment of the sort that Muskie had been advocating. Finn, supra note 47, at 261–
62.
50. Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the Environment:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs. & the H. Comm. on Sci. &
Astronautics, 90th Cong. (1968) [hereinafter Colloquium]. The stated objective of the
Colloquium, as reported in the resulting white paper, was to “avoid conventional committee
jurisdiction limitations and bring together interested members with executive branch heads
and leaders of industrial, commercial, academic, and scientific organizations.” STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFS. & STAFF OF H. COMM. ON SCI. & ASTRONAUTICS,
CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 90th Cong. iii
(1968) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
51. Colloquium, supra note 50, at 16 (“Let no one suppose there is any organizational
panacea for dealing with environmental problems at the Federal level. . . . [T]o combine all
programs affecting the environment in one department would obviously be physically
impossible. . . . Each agency should designate responsible officials to establish environmental
checkpoints to be sure they have properly assessed this impact.”). Enclosed in the records of
the Colloquium is the statement of Dr. Gerald F. Tape, commissioner of the Atomic Energy
Commission, who argued for a similar EIS-adjacent proposal: “We can commit ourselves to
the interdisciplinary process in environmental decision-making just as we are committed to
the democratic process, and certain procedural checks and balances, in political decisionmaking. We can, for example, decide to involve from the beginning of the planning process,
and to take fully into account the counsel of . . . professionals . . . . And we can, as a matter of
policy, do much more to facilitate the timely participation of informed citizens in
environmental decision-making.” Id. at 221.
52. Colloquium, supra note 50, at 15.
53. Id. at 15–16.
54. Id. at 18. These comments were also reprinted in the white paper. WHITE PAPER, supra
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Jackson and others, including Dr. Donald Hornig, science advisor to President
Johnson, emphasized the need for “action-forcing processes.”55 One last testimony,
in particular, had far-reaching effects on the development of NEPA. Dr. Dillon
Ripley, an ornithologist and secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, articulated a
version of the environmental impact assessment process which would closely reflect
some key language of NEPA:
There should be established mechanisms to assess and predict the effects
of technology on the environment prior to its introduction into the public
domain . . . . These methods must certainly include detailed ecological
analysis and must, of course, be complemented by sociological,
engineering, and economic analysis so that each perspective can be
evaluated within the context of human fulfillment. Additionally, these
devices must be available at all decision making levels, governmental
and private. Inclusion of this recommendation in a Congressional
statement of national policy would stimulated [sic] their development.56
Although not credited to Dr. Ripley, this framing of the analysis procedure was
repeated in the Colloquium’s report as one of the proposed “Elements of a National
Policy for the Environment.”57 Thus, by as late as 1968,58 the major policy
ingredients of NEPA were already part of the conversation.
A. Almost NEPA: Senate Bill 1075
The environmental movement was still cresting in the final year of the 1960s.
Pressure on Congress to integrate environmental values into federal governance
exploded in the period immediately following the Colloquium. As was the case with
the Clean Air Act59 passed the following year, momentum for NEPA was driven in
large part by broad public cynicism regarding the efficacy and responsiveness of the

note 50, at 9.
55. Colloquium, supra note 50, at 60. Jackson didn’t provide any substantive discussion,
however, and only recognized a general need. Dr. Hornig called for “a suitable means of
insuring [policy] effectiveness and carrying it out, and an evaluation and rationalization of
effects on other national goals.” Id. at 31.
56. Id. at 213.
57. WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 15–16 (“Alternatives must be actively generated and
widely discussed. Technological development, introduction of new factors affecting the
environment, and modifications of the landscape must be planned to maintain the diversity of
plants and animals. Furthermore, such activities should proceed only after an ecological
analysis and projection of probable effects.”). For the later significance of these comments, as
well as a discussion of the Smithsonian counsel who offered the remarks, see infra note 146
and accompanying text.
58. In 1968, Train similarly testified before the Public Works Committee that any
statement of a congressional policy on the environment must necessarily be accompanied by
some “institutional innovation necessary to implement such a policy.” Waste Management
Research and Environmental Quality Management: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Comm. on Pub. Works, 90th Cong. 157 (1968) (statement of Russell
E. Train, President, Conservation Foundation).
59. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
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federal government.60 Savvy politicians realized the strength of this new class of
voters and vied to add to their environmental credentials.61 Jackson and Muskie, two
“Senate barons”62 and candidates for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination,63
both competed for the environmentalist vote,64 although they approached the issue
from very different perspectives. They each had impressive records. Senator
Muskie’s Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee had been actively legislating to
combat pollution since 1963.65 The Interior Committee, under Jackson, crafted
classical conservation bills like the Wilderness Act of 196466 and the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968.67

60. “A primary purpose of the bill,” Senator Jackson told the Senate, referring to Senate
Bill 1075, “is to restore public confidence in the Federal Government’s capacity to achieve
important public purposes and objectives and at the same time to maintain and enhance the
quality of the environment.” S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8 (1969). See generally Brigham Daniels,
Andrew P. Follett & Josh Davis, The Making of the Clean Air Act, 71 HASTINGS L. J. 901,
907–15 (2020); Brigham Daniels & Andrew P. Follett, Building Credibility: Lessons from the
Leadership of William Ruckelshaus, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10238, 10239–40 (2020).
61. Henry M. Jackson, Environmental Policy and the Congress, 11 NAT. RES. J. 403, 408
(1971). Muskie was not competing for total ownership, however, as he was skeptical of the
theoretical approach of Jackson’s bill in the first place. See Muskie & Cutler, supra note 29,
at 165–66.
62. Leon Billings & Tom Jorling, The Earth Institute – Columbia University – Origins of
Environmental Law (Class 3; Fall 2014), VIMEO, at 6:08–6:22 (Sept. 2014),
https://vimeo.com/122375776 [https://perma.cc/QAQ3-ZE5G] [hereinafter Columbia
Lecture].
63. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, former counsel, S. Pub. Works Comm., in Provo,
Utah (Feb. 11, 2019). See generally Daniels et al., supra note 60 (explaining the political
pressure Muskie exerted on Nixon). As Leon Billings later characterized, Senator Jackson
“had ambitions of his own” in pushing for NEPA. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 5:47–
5:52.
64. With an engine of dissatisfied youth and progressives, environmentalism
complemented anti-war and consumer rights movements and burst into the mainstream in the
late 1960s. “Environment” as an issue was dominated by popular “God and motherhood”
concern over pollution. See Jackson, supra note 61, at 406–09; Henry M. Jackson, Foreword:
Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1970); Weiland,
supra note 37, at 279; Henry Caulfield, The Conservation and Environmental Movements: An
Historical Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 13,
19 (James P. Lester ed., 1989); J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, CONSERVATIVE CONSERVATIONIST:
RUSSELL E. TRAIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 59–60 (2006);
PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 898 (1994);
PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 323; Tarlock, supra note 8, at 83–84; PHILLIP WEINBERG &
KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 56–58 (1998); Environment in
Politics, SARASOTA FLA. HERALD-TRIB. (undated) (news article on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
65. Finn, supra note 47, at 223. Robert F. Blomquist, To Stir up Public Interest: Edmund
S. Muskie and the US Senate Special Subcommittee's Water Pollution Investigations and
Legislative Activities, 1963-66 — A Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental Policy
Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 16–17 (1997).
66. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2018).
67. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-542, §§ 1–16, 82 Stat. 906
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–87 (2000)).
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Many other legislators, of course, were deeply involved in environmental
lawmaking. During this period, a broad wave of environmental policy bills were
introduced and debated in the Senate, including bills seeking to create what would
come to resemble the CEQ later established by NEPA, establish a national
environmental ethic, or coordinate environmental projects between agencies. During
the 91st Congress alone (January 3, 1969–January 3, 1971), 121 bills signed into law
were listed by the Congressional Research Service as “environment oriented,”68 and
by the summer of 1969, forty bills concerned with a national policy on the
environment in particular were introduced during that session of Congress.69
Due to his stature in the Senate, his leadership in the Interior Committee, and his
visibility during the previous year’s colloquium, Jackson’s bill was seen as the
frontrunner. Jackson introduced Senate Bill 107570 to the Senate in February 1969.
It was sparse, with only a preamble and two titles—the first directing the Secretary
of the Interior to conduct research on the state of the environment and the second
creating a CEQ and mandating an annual report.71 As originally introduced, Senate
Bill 1075 had nothing even resembling an EIS provision.72
Following initial hearings in April,73 the bill was amended to include a policy
statement on the environment (what became Section 101 of NEPA)74 and a provision

68. ENV’T POL’Y DIV., CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBR. OF CONG., 92D CONG., CONGRESS AND
245 (Comm.
Print 1971) (prepared at the request of Henry M. Jackson); see FLIPPEN, supra note 64, at 59.
69. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 12 n.7 (1969) (“In the present Congress, an initial tabulation
indicates that over 40 bills have been introduced which are concerned either with a national
policy for the environment or the establishment of machinery to study the overall problems of
the human environment. Of the 16 standing committees of the Senate, eight have broad
jurisdiction of this type of legislation. Of the 21 House standing committees, 11 are similarly
involved.”).
70. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S. 1075, 91st Cong. (1969). Senate Bill
1075 was functionally a reintroduction of the previous year’s Senate Bill 2805, S. 2805, 90th
Cong. (1968), and a spiritual successor to the Murray Bill, S. 2549, 86th Cong. (1959).
71. 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson); see also LIROFF, supra
note 8, at 15. The Council of Economic Advisers was established under the Employment Act
of 1946. National Policy on Employment and Productivity, 15 U.S.C. § 1023 (2018).
72. Although Caldwell claims it was already under preparation. CALDWELL, supra note
37, at 63.
73. Hearing on S. 1075, supra note 47, at 1.
74. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 1–2 (“The Congress, recognizing that man depends on his
biological and physical surroundings . . . hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences; (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice; (5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and (6) enhance the
quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
THE NATION’S ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE 91ST CONGRESS
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establishing an individual “right to a healthful environment.”75 Jackson’s Section 102
mandated that agencies produce “findings” regarding their actions76 (rather than what
later would become “detailed statement[s]”).77
At the same time, Muskie had been promoting Senate Bill 7,78 which would come
to have significant consequences for the legislative history of NEPA. The drafting of
Senate Bill 7 was driven by the still unfolding Santa Barbara Oil Spill, called by
Secretary Udall “a sort of conservation ‘Bay of Pigs,’”79 which Russell Train
regarded as the vital impetus for the larger environmental movement.80 Concerned
primarily with the discharge of oil and other pollutants into U.S. waters,81 Muskie’s
Water Quality Improvement Act, like many other proposed bills at the time, sought
to establish some sort of council in the Executive Office of the President to oversee
environmental issues and to advise the President, although the two iterations varied
slightly.82
Despite some similarities, the two bills exemplified the differing approaches to
lawmaking taken by Jackson and Muskie. Jackson took a more optimistic83 view that
administrative reorganization and a policy could improve the environmental impact
of agency actions. Muskie, by contrast, believed that process was insufficient. Only

resources.”); 115 CONG. REC. 29,089 (1969); ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 4–5 (claiming the
lack of policy title was a strategy to maintain jurisdiction and ensure the bill wouldn’t be
referred to the Public Works Committee); see also LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 37–38.
Section 101’s final author was William Van Ness, who also included the individual right
provision at the request of Henry J. Kellerman. Finn, supra note 47, at 427.
75. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 2.
76. Id. Section 102(3) as it was passed by the Senate was authored by Daniel Dreyfus.
Finn, supra note 47, at 428.
77. Finn, supra note 47, at 305. Conceding to the administration, the amended Senate Bill
1075 included that agencies must consider environmental impact, but only “to the fullest
extent possible,” and “significant federal actions affecting” the human environment was
changed to a narrower scoped “major federal actions significantly affecting” the
environment—raising the threshold for a Section 102 trigger. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 2. See
LIROFF, supra note 8, at 25.
78. S. 7, 91st Cong. (1969).
79. Environmental Citizen Action: Hearings on H.R. 49, H.R. 290, H.R.4517, H.R. 8050,
H.R. 5074, H.R. 5075, H.R. 5076, H.R. 5819, H.R. 6862, H.R. 9564, H.R. 8331, H.R. 9583
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife Conservation of the H. Comm. on Merch.
Marine & Fisheries, 92nd Cong. 131 (1971) (statement of Joseph L. Sax, Law Professor, Univ.
of Mich.).
80. Memorandum from Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Env’t Quality, to Robert
P. Mayo, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. and Budget (Apr. 16, 1970) (unpublished memorandum on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
81. From a conceptual perspective, Senate Bill 7 was considered significant by drafters
in leading to the policy framework of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018)). See Columbia Lecture, supra note
62.
82. Kane Sauchuk, The Origins of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (June 15, 2015), https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2015/06/theorigins-of-the-national-environmental-policy-act-of-1969 [https://perma.cc/BE8P-DBGS].
83. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 11:00.

882

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:865

substance—standards-based regulations and enforceable laws to hold industries’ and
government’s feet to the fire—could make a lasting change.84
President Richard Nixon, a master politician in his own right, was of course well
aware of the rising environmental movement, especially given the threat of running
against Jackson or Muskie.85 He could play the same game, and better.86 Thus, in
May, while Jackson’s and Muskie’s bills were working their way through committee,
Nixon issued Executive Order 11,47287 to create an interagency Environmental
Quality Council (EQC). The EQC would be composed of the Vice President, six
Cabinet secretaries, and other appointed leaders within the bureaucracy.88 The
President would sit as chair.89 A revival of a similar proposal he had offered as Vice
President during the Eisenhower administration,90 Nixon argued the Council would
be “a Cabinet-level advisory group which will provide the focal point for this
administration's efforts to protect all of our natural resources.”91 Nixon’s move did
not have its intended effect and was even criticized as insincere and an attempt to
slow the dramatic momentum building in Congress for far-reaching legislation.92
Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, for example, introduced legislation “to
provide for the inclusion of environmental quality considerations in the decisionmaking processes of government,” which demonstrated such momentum.93
Immediately following Caldwell’s supposedly mythic94 testimony in the April
hearings on Senate Bill 1075 before Jackson’s Interior Committee, Tydings stressed
the urgent need for a national statement of environmental policy. But he went further,
insisting:
There must be an office which will ensure that environmental
considerations are brought into the decision-making processes of
government.
...

84. See id. at 33:50.
85. Audiotape: Nixon White House Tapes, Tape 623-019 (Nov. 23, 1971) (“I think we
might have to modify some of the legislation you’ve got in the environmental pack. But I think
failure to do this will let the Muskies . . . uh, whoever is going to be in, Jackson (Henry Scoop),
and the rest of these guys take this issue away from you. I think this would be the worst kind
of disaster. Because the economy is kind of a mediocre thing.”) (available with the Nixon
Presidential Library).
86. See Finn, supra note 47, at 294–95.
87. Exec. Order No. 11,472, 3 C.F.R. § 101 (1969).
88. Id.; LIROFF, supra note 8, at 21.
89. 3 C.F.R. § 101; S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 15–16 (1969).
90. 115 CONG. REC. 29,089 (1969).
91. Statement Announcing the Creation of the Environmental Quality Council and the
Citizens’ Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality, 221 PUB. PAPERS 422 (May 29,
1969).
92. See Hearing on S. 1075, supra note 47, at 92, 98–101, 103, 115; 115 CONG. REC.
26,581 (1969) (statement of Rep. Obey); id. at 26,582 (statement of Rep. Minish); John R.
Sandler, Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 37
BROOK. L. REV. 139, 141 (1970); LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 42.
93. S. 1818, 91st Cong. § 1 (1969).
94. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Mr. Chairman, . . . I would like to urge the Committee in its deliberation
to consider creating an overview agency that goes beyond mere advice.
I think it is necessary to establish an agency with some political muscle.
And I think the time to do this is now.95
Unlike Jackson’s bill, Tydings’s proposed CEQ variant outstripped anything that
Jackson and his committee would consider or enact. Rather than just review
environmental impacts, Tydings’s oversight body would have power to delay
projects it saw as environmentally damaging.96
A similarly powerful CEQ was considered in the House hearings alongside
Jackson’s bill, although this language was “put on the back burner” in executive
sessions.97 The similarities between the House and Senate bills were limited to
general structure and purpose—both House Bill 6750 and the Senate bill sought to
establish a national policy on the environment and create a council on environmental
issues within the Executive Office of the President.98
Members of the Public Works Committee expressed concern to Jackson that the
Title I Amendments to Senate Bill 1075 after committee hearings had dramatically
affected the substance of the bill. Public Works Committee Chair Randolph met with
Jackson to express these concerns, as well as his committee’s view that the
amendments merited hearings and deeper scrutiny.99 Without making the bill or
report available, the Interior Committee reported Senate Bill 1075 two days after
Jackson’s meeting with Randolph.100 In a move that would make the Public Works
Committee feel deceived, Jackson bypassed his agreement with Senator Randolph,
and moved to have Senate Bill 1075 passed on the morning calendar the very next
day. Jackson reportedly feared that scrutiny from the administration and Muskie
(especially given his reputation in the Senate) would sink the bill.101
In order to shortcut perceived obstacles, Jackson told Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield that his bill would have minor impacts,102 and should be passed by

95. Hearing on S. 1075, supra note 47, at 138. Most pointedly, Tydings told Jackson, “I
hope that you will consider at least giving the agency or council, or whatever you want to call
it, the actual political muscle to do the job, because if you just have advice, I don't think it will
serve the purpose that we need.” Id. at 137.
96. Tydings stated that his overview council would, like Jackson’s CEQ, have “power
[to] review” and advise the President on environmental matters. Hearing on S. 1075, supra
note 47, at 136–38. More significantly, however, it would have “power [to] delay.” Id.
97. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 23. Subcommittee Counsel Ned Everett proposed a “stoporder” power to be held by the CEQ for ongoing projects and actions in the House side, widely
supported by virtually all witnesses. Id. Anthony Wayne Smith, former president and general
counsel of the National Parks Association suggested such a CEQ “stop-order.” Hearing on S.
1075, supra note 47, at 177.
98. 115 CONG. REC. 26,590 (1969). Wayne Aspinall opposed the bill, placed himself on
the conference committee, and would affect the bill’s language as it related to “to the fullest
extent possible.” LIROFF, supra note 8, at 28. For more on Dingell’s role in developing the
CEQ idea and details, see CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 30; LIROFF, supra note 8, at 26–29.
99. Finn, supra note 47, at 454–56.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 460–61, 475.
102. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63. As Muskie later summarized in an
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consent during the Senate’s routine morning hours.103 Thus, the bill faced no
substantive consideration by the Senate, nor was it discussed, and its passage took
only a few minutes, being witnessed by “no more than seven Senators.”104
After Senate Bill 1075 passed the Senate, Jackson entered into the record a written
statement declaring the bill to be extremely significant in the domestic and
environmental sense, perhaps the most important that would be presented during the
session of Congress.105 Lacking floor debate on Section 102 and only a slim hearing
record covering the bill,106 the ramifications of Senate Bill 1075 were poorly
understood,107 and not communicated to interest groups.108 The legislation was
almost totally ignored by news media.109
B. NEPA Becomes NEPA: The Untold Story of Section 102
The bill shepherded through the Senate by Jackson was marked by the optimistic
assumption that “a clear statement of goals, science and technology, if vigorously
supported, would provide the knowledge and wherewithal to solve environmental
problems.”110 Muskie was less sanguine. This Section tells the story of how Muskie

article generally criticizing the regulatory approach of Senate Bill 1075, “following Senate
hearings, the bill was rewritten by the Interior Committee in closed door marking sessions.
The new version of the bill which was sent to the Senate floor had not been the subject of any
public hearings, and it was passed on the consent calendar without Senate debate.” Muskie et
al., supra note 29, at 163 n.2.
103. 115 CONG. REC. 19,008–09 (1969); CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 30.
104. Finn, supra note 47, at 457–58.
105. 115 CONG. REC. 19,009 (1969) (“Mr. President, S. 1075, the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 . . . is in my judgment the most significant and important measure in the
area of long-range domestic policymaking that will come before the 91st Congress. Without
question, it is the most significant measure in the area of natural resource policy ever
considered by the Congress. . . . This constitutes a statutory enlargement of the responsibilities
and the concerns of all instrumentalities of the Federal Government. . . . In many respects, the
only precedent and parallel to what is proposed in S. 1075 is in the Full Employment Act of
1946, which declared an historic national policy on management of the economy and
established the Council of Economic Advisers.”); 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969); Interview
with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63.
106. See generally Hearing on S. 1075, supra note 47.
107. See supra Part I.
108. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 10–11; MENELL ET AL., supra note 64, at 898; PLATER ET AL.,
supra note 37, at 323–24 (calling NEPA “accidental legislation”); Tarlock, supra note 8, at
83–85 (“[T]he basic idea behind the statute survived from start to finish and the entire process
took place out of the public eye.”). The biggest news story on January 1 was whether Texas,
which defeated Notre Dame in the Cotton Bowl, or Penn State, which downed Missouri in the
Orange Bowl, should be the national football champion. See ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 1–3;
CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 64; LIROFF, supra note 8, at 34–35; Jackson, supra note 61, at
406–07.
109. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 10. Many assumed at the time that NEPA was a “mere”
antipollution bill. CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 27, 37; LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at ix.
110. Finn, supra note 47, at 93; see id. at 465 (“[Jackson] thought that Federal agencies
were administered by reasonable men who would respond to a mandate or a procedure
requiring consideration of environmental values.”).
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transformed Jackson’s bill into the NEPA we know today.111 To be fair, the need for
language to make the Act effective was recognized early in the drafting stage.112 But
the actual text forcing development of the EIS was the result of next-to-last minute
intervention by Muskie.
Section 102 is NEPA’s most significant provision.113 It requires that:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.114
After Senate Bill 1075 was reported to and passed by the Senate in early July
1969, controversy between Senate environmental leaders Jackson and Muskie
erupted. Senator Muskie was troubled that neither he nor his committee had an
opportunity to consider the bill or offer amendments—Senate Bill 1075 as passed,
he believed, would be ineffective.115 Muskie argued that, unlike his standards-setting

111. For more on Muskie’s “pessimistic” worldview, see Daniels et al., supra note 60.
112. CALDWELL, supra note 37.
113. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TOGETHER WITH THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS 133
(Dale Curtis & Barry Walden Walsh eds., 1991); Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law
Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2014); Houck, supra note 8, at 190; Joseph L.
Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1973); ANDERSON,
supra note 8, at 1–3, 275; CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 78; DAVID M. DRIESEN, ROBERT W.
ADLER & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 121 (2d ed. 2011); ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 28 (7th ed. 2008); RASBAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 291–92; J.B. RUHL,
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & ALEXANDRA B. KLASS, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 406–07 (3d ed. 2014); JAMES SALZMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 321;
PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 56–58 (1998);
see JONATHAN R. NASH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: THE ESSENTIALS 129–31 (2010);
Tarlock, supra note 8, at 105. But see CALDWELL, supra note 37, at 30; id. at 38 (arguing that
seeing 102 as “the primary purpose and intent of NEPA” is a “limited understanding” or a
“misinterpretation”); id. at xvi–xvii.
114. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat.
852, 853 (1970).
115. Taken together, Muskie saw the environmental laws produced by his committee as
creating a sort of national statement on the policy by themselves, built around forcing action
and changing behavior. See Muskie et al., supra note 29; see also Colloquium, supra note 50,
at 44. This is, as it turns out, the better and more effective means of affecting government
planning and actions. See Houck, supra note 8, at 187–90 (“Many of the major, long-overdue,
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legislation, NEPA only created “meager,”116 “minimal procedural standards of
conduct”117 that only apply to a narrow set of governmental actions.118 “When you
read words in a statute, ‘lofty’ is not good enough to get to that endpoint where
someone or something changes its behavior,” Public Works minority counsel Tom
Jorling later said of the bill and the Public Works Committee’s reaction.119
Despite being characterized in NEPA histories as being jealous or late to the
game120 (generally acting as a roadblock to the Act’s passage), Muskie had solid
reasons to be worried. He viewed NEPA as counterproductive, potentially hampering
the Public Works’ ability to continue creating standards-based antipollution
statutes.121 Staff member and Muskie confidant, Leon Billings, recalled, “I can’t
describe to you the words that Senator Muskie used when he found out what the
amendment said, but . . . they were probably not words that you’d ordinarily use in a
public place.”122 Muskie was also upset by the parliamentary shortcut Jackson
employed to speed up passage. Public Works staff characterized Muskie’s view of
the normal Senate procedures as “sacred.”123 Muskie felt Jackson had abused his
position, running his committee as a “one-man show”124 and short-circuiting the
proper functioning of the Senate.125

and extremely difficult improvements in federal planning—improvements clearly aspired to
in NEPA's substantive provisions—are coming about through other, more targeted laws with
more specific requirements, such as the Endangered Species Act and the Section 404
(wetlands) program of the Clean Water Act. Yet other federal laws have since reached out to
address the impacts of private actions on air, water, soils, and nearly every conceivable
medium.”). A similar argument is made by Tom Jorling and Leon Billings. Columbia Lecture,
supra note 62, at 8:00; see also Finn, supra note 47, at 223–24 (agreeing generally that
Muskie’s approach created justiciable rights in a way that NEPA did not). Further, a similar
argument was made on the Senate floor. 115 CONG. REC. 29,052 (1969).
116. Muskie et al., supra note 29, at 173.
117. Id. at 164.
118. Id. at 173.
119. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 34:30.
120. Kalen, supra note 8, at 144; LIROFF, supra note 8, at 199; see CALDWELL, supra note
37, at 29–36 (“Disagreements between Jackson and Muskie and staffs . . . threatened delay of
Jackson’s bill S. 1075 . . . . Senator Jackson and his principal counsel on environmental policy,
William Van Ness, proved to be the better legislative tacticianers.”). Legislation was
“complicated” by these rivalries. Id.; LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 43 (characterizing
“squabbling” which “held up” the bills); Finn, supra note 47, at 192–93, 204–06; Interview
with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63.
121. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORTS, https://ce
q.doe.gov/ceq-reports/annual_environmental_quality_reports.html [https://perma.cc/P55RW6LC]. NEPA provided that annual reports on the environment only be submitted to one
committee, Jackson’s Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, which Muskie feared would
create new precedent for the referral of any future bills on the environment to Interior alone.
Id.
122. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 31:20.
123. Id. at 25:20.
124. Id. at 26:10.
125. Muskie prided himself in the unusual bipartisanship of the Public Works Committee.
Id. at 25:00.
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Muskie and the Public Works Committee added in a policy statement into Title II
of Senate Bill 7 to increase overlap with Senate Bill 1075,126 and using the two points
of bill overlap (the overview council and policy statement)127 as leverage, Muskie
arranged with Senate leader Mike Mansfield to put an informal stay or “hold”128 on
Jackson’s bill until the conflict between Senate Bill 7 and Senate Bill 1075 could be
resolved. Jackson’s bill was prevented from advancing to conference, while
Muskie’s bill was withheld from the Senate floor.129 According to Leon Billings,130
Mansfield was upset that Jackson had misled him,131 so Mansfield privately met with
the two senators and some staff, saying, “Boys, you are hurting the reputation of the
Senate of the United States. Get this done.”132 Billings, representing Muskie’s Public
Works Committee, met with William Van Ness and Senator Jackson133 and
introduced amendments to the bill, which they believed would prevent damage to
their own regulatory programs and strengthen the action-forcing capacity of Section
102. According to staffers Billings and Jorling, they were concerned about protecting
their committee’s jurisdiction but equally sought to make the bill “work.”134
Their primary focus was on the “findings”135 mandated by the Interior
Committee’s Senate Bill 1075 as it was passed in the Senate.136 They felt this

126. Finn, supra note 47, at 452.
127. See S. 7, 91st Cong. (1969); supra text accompanying note 78. The national policy
provision contained in Title II of Senate Bill 7 was grafted in from another Muskie
subcommittee bill—the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1969, introduced in June.
115 CONG. REC. 24,605 (1969) (statement of Sen. Randolph); Finn, supra note 47, at 450–51.
128. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 24:45.
129. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63.
130. See Daniels et al., supra note 60, for more on Leon Billings and his contribution to
environmental law, as well as his strong personality.
131. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 37:10 (stating that Jackson “misled him
[Mansfield]—some would use a stronger word”).
132. Id. at 53:20; Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63 (“But you don't want to
understate how tense it was in the beginning of this process.”); LIROFF, supra note 8, at 27
(reporting similar language of a staffer—possibly Jorling).
133. Billings remembers meeting at first with both Van Ness and Jackson, but Van Ness
refused the amendments. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 55:45. When Billings met with
Jackson alone later, Jackson reviewed the proposed amendments and, apparently under the
impression that the amendments were significant, asked, “Is this it?” Id. Billings was sent by
Muskie since Muskie “simply didn’t like Senator Jackson,” who said, “I’m not calling that
[expletive].” There was a great “personality conflict” between the two—Jackson was a hawk
on Vietnam who acted as a strong proponent of SST while Muskie was a dove. Id. at 52:15,
1:03:00 (emphasis added). According to Jackson staffers, Jackson tried to make peace, but
Muskie was “petty and pouty.” WILLIAM W. PROCHNAU & RICHARD W. LARSEN, A CERTAIN
DEMOCRAT: SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 276 (1972). At one point,
staffers said that Jackson called Muskie but was shouted down, causing Jackson to hang up
and mutter, “That guy is just utterly hopeless.” Id. at 277.
134. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62.
135. Interestingly, the Senate’s section-by-section analysis of the new language borrows
both terms in discussing the new 102(2)(C), speaking both of “statements” and “findings.”
115 CONG. REC. 29,085 (1969).
136. See S. REP. NO. 91-296 (1969).
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language was inflexible137 and would only require reporting the final decision along
with a brief justification—no more than a reporting mechanism for administrative
decisions.138 More than anything, it was vague.139 Where would the findings go?
Who would review them? How long were they supposed to be? Not only might the
findings fail to force any action or serious consideration on the part of federal mission
agencies, but there was also a fear among members of the Public Works Committee
and its staff that such a provision would create a shield behind which environmental
degradation could be protected140—a “high hurdle” for potential litigants to
overcome.141 Public Works Minority Committee counsel, Tom Jorling, recounted
that:142
Senator Muskie’s substantive concern with the National Environmental
Policy Act was that, the way it was written, it authorized federal agencies
that have a tradition of adverse impact on the environment to simply
prepare a report and make a finding that to the extent that the
environment was harmed, it was necessary and appropriate and
warranted.143
The “findings” required by Jackson’s Senate bill, after all, were regarded by staff
of Jackson’s committee only to be “brief, general statements averaging about two
pages in length.”144 Muskie wanted more. He and Public Works’ chief of staff, Don
Nicoll, offered the text “detailed statement.” This language seems directly drawn
from the suggestion of Dillon Ripley in the 1968 Colloquium.145 Indeed, this was no
coincidence. Ripley’s statement, it turns out, were not the words of Dr. Ripley
himself, but of Jorling, who was at the time Smithsonian Institution counsel and who

137. Finn, supra note 47, at 505.
138. See id. at 468. Billings wrote a memo to Muskie using the Santa Barbara oil spill as
an example of how, upon reporting the “finding” that environmental risks were outweighed
by other considerations, agencies might be protected from challenge on environmental
grounds. Id.
139. Id. at 469.
140. See Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 39:50.
141. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63.
142. Id.; see also Finding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) (defining “finding”
as “the result of the deliberations of a jury or a court”); Finding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(6th ed. 1990); LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 45; Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at
41:40 (explaining that the term might be abused, for example, by the Secretary of the Interior
who would be empowered to say “I’m finding that the impact is warranted” and go ahead); id.
at 1:00:00.
143. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 39:15.
144. Hanna J. Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RES. J. 323, 330 (1976) (quoting Claude E.
Barfield & Richard Corrigan, White House Seeks to Restrict Scope of Environment Law, 4
NAT’L J., 336, 340 (1972)). Dreyfus defended a similar view later on, as well. Daniel A.
Dreyfus, NEPA: The Original Intent of the Law, 109 J. PROF. ISSUES IN ENG’G 249 (1983).
Comparing the post-passage comments of Interior’s Dreyfus and Public Works’ Jorling and
Billings might provide some insight by contrast into the conflicting views of the two parties.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 56–57.
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authored the Colloquium statement.146 Jorling viewed this amendment as critical to
NEPA’s power. “Detailed statement was sufficient to allow litigants now that were
starting to bubble up . . . to challenge federal agencies that wrote a statement less
than detailed . . . [this] led to an outpouring of litigation.”147
Another way of breaking down the administrative shield the “findings” might
pose,148 the Public Works Committee, Muskie in particular,149 insisted on what would
become Section 102(2)(C)(iii), requiring as a part of any detailed statement
“alternatives to the proposed action.”150 The alternatives mandate has come to define
NEPA’s “heart,”151 forcing agencies to consider options with fewer environmental
impacts.
Most of all, Muskie believed that self-policing by mission-oriented agencies
would be insufficient to change environmental decision making,152 like letting the
fox guard the henhouse.153 Relying on the White House or the Bureau of the Budget
to oversee the “findings,” as Interior had imagined, did not seem promising.154
Similarly, Muskie viewed the Jackson committee’s assumptions that “agency
policies would improve through organizational learning”155 as unduly optimistic and
saw some form of external review with teeth as the only reasonable means of shifting
behavior.156
Although Muskie initially wanted more centralized oversight and policing by an
environmental agency,157 it was resolved that engaging other agencies and the public

146. Finn, supra note 47, at 279 (also calling Jorling’s comments the “most thoughtful
statement of the colloquium”).
147. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 42:38.
148. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63 (fearing that the findings “would be
interpreted by the project agency as a way of showing that the project was the project that had
to go forward”).
149. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 55:00.
150. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63; Columbia Lecture, supra note 62,
at 43:20. Here, we are careful not to replace one heroic myth with another—the need to assess
alternatives was considered in the Colloquium white paper and Senate report and was not the
spontaneous invention of Muskie in 1969. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 2 (1969).
151. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1995).
152. 115 CONG. REC. 29,053 (1969).
153. Finn, supra note 47, at 465.
154. See id. at 469–71.
155. Liroff, supra note 8, at 154–55.
156. This conflict of attitudinal or behavioral change dominated this Muskie-Jackson
conflict. Public Works feared administrative decisions would be made “in camera.” Columbia
Lecture, supra note 62, at 40:20.
157. See Finn, supra note 47, at 503–04. Muskie later recovered some lost ground through
later legislation. See LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION 6 (2007) (“To further
clarify agencies’ responsibilities with regard to public involvement in the NEPA process, in
December 1970, Congress added Section 309 to the Clean Air Act. Provisions of Section 309
made explicit that the Administrator of the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has a duty to examine and comment on all EISs. After that review, the Administrator
was directed to make those comments public and, if the proposal was environmentally
‘unsatisfactory,’ to publish this finding and refer the matter to the CEQ.”) (citation omitted);
42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2018).
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(implying citizen suits) was the most direct solution. Muskie successfully inserted
language mandating that agencies “consult with and obtain the comments of [other]
federal agenc[ies]” and the public.158 Concerning agency review, Muskie had in mind
the air and water pollution control agencies that had specialized content knowledge
and which Muskie desired to have an involved review role.159 His proposed Office
of Environmental Quality would also provide staff manpower to assist the CEQ
review statements.160 As Richard Liroff, environmental scholar and prolific NEPA
historian, recounted161:
Jackson’s staff assumed that agency policies would improve through
organizational learning, and that the Office of Management and Budget
would play an important policing role. Other than the role contemplated
for OMB, significant external oversight was not envisioned. In contrast,
Senator Muskie held the view that agencies could not be trusted with
environmental responsibilities.162
Muskie and Public Works also envisioned a key role for courts and the public
through creating the opportunity for citizen suits. As the Calvert Cliffs decision
would later make clear, the amendments to Section 102 created opportunities for
litigants to involve courts directly in environmental matters.163 Jorling and Senator
Nelson of the Public Works Committee in particular championed the disclosure of
detailed statements to the public.164
Finally, Muskie requested that agencies with clear environmental mandates
enforcing antipollution statutes should be exempted from the EIS process.165 Muskie
“feared that S. 1075 would debilitate existing environmental protection programs

158. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852,
853 (1970); Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 43:45. This amendment is mentioned in the
conference report, but in such a way that seems to imply that the change was made during one
of the three conference meetings. The conference report comments on this new provision that
it is not intended to “unreasonably delay” federal proposals. H.R. REP. NO. 91-765, at 9–10
(1969); Finn, supra note 47, at 503.
159. See Finn, supra note 47, at 504; 115 CONG. REC. 29,053 (1969).
160. Finn, supra note 47, at 501.
161. See Liroff, supra note 8, at 155 (“[Muskie’s] belief spawned the impact statement
requirement, an alteration of Jackson’s action-forcing requirement for a ‘finding’ of
environmental impact.”); LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 47 (noting that it was the
compromise that acted as the creation of the EIS as we know it); Sauchuk, supra note 82.
Caldwell later maintained a similar view. Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act,
supra note 37, at 50035. See generally Daniel A. Dreyfus & Helen M. Ingram, The National
Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. RES. J. 243 (1976).
162. Liroff, supra note 8, at 154–55 (citations omitted).
163. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 44:28. Such a degree of public engagement was
probably impossible to foresee, given the then immature state of environmental law in general.
164. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 55:00; Finn, supra note 47, at 504. William Van
Ness at one pointed stated his preference that the findings of Section 102(d) be made public,
although there was no means in his bill to make this a reality. It took the Public Works
Committee to make public engagement explicit. Finn, supra note 47, at 490–91.
165. Muskie et al., supra note 29, at 164–65.
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over which his Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee had jurisdiction,”166 by
introducing cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulatory processes in which
economic considerations ought to play no part.167
These major amendments168 dramatically changed the meaning and importance
of Section 102 and were seen as generally constructive by Interior staff (including
Caldwell).169 In satisfying the Public Works Committee’s apprehension and concerns
over the Jackson bill, Muskie needed to compromise as well. His proposed Office on
Environmental Quality was downgraded to support staff for Jackson’s Board of
Environmental Advisers.170 Both Committees would be granted jurisdiction to
receive the Board’s annual reports, defusing the turf battle.171

166. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 18.
167. Columbia Lecture, supra note 62, at 48:30. Jorling and Billings feared a “hidden
agenda” that would weaken environmental agencies by foisting nonenvironmental values into
their decision-making process. Id. at 49:28. Leon Billings even believed that NEPA’s potential
negative side effects were a move by Jackson and others to appease nuclear energy and
extraction interests in the West—the home of most members of the Interior Committee. Id. at
16:55; see also Finn, supra note 47, at 447. That Jackson was later upset by NEPA might lend
credence that this is a nontrivial polemic. See ROBERT G. KAUFMAN, HENRY M. JACKSON: A
LIFE IN POLITICS 208 (2000). Dreyfus had similar qualms with the outcome of Public Works’
EIS. Dreyfus, supra note 144, at 249. Further, Jorling stated that the Interior Committee had
“no concept” of the threat or risk at hand because they were inexperienced in writing statutes
that “ultimately result[ed] in a pound of pollution being removed.” Columbia Lecture, supra
note 62, at 51:00. In order to streamline environmental governance and eliminate any need for
the consideration of nonenvironmental values, Section 104 was amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4334
(2012). 115 CONG. REC. 29,053 (1969) (“This language [the intercommittee compromise
language] eliminated the requirement that a ‘finding’ be made but provides that environmental
impact be discussed as a part of any report on legislation, or any decision to commence a major
activity. The requirement that established environmental agencies be consulted and that their
comments accompany any such report would place the environmental control responsibility
where it should be.”). See also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm., 449 F.2d 1109, 1125–26 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
168. We note that each of these amendments was significant and to the effect of
strengthening Section 102, while virtually all other changes to the bill originating outside of
Interior (but accepted by Jackson) were to the effect of weakening the bill. See Eva H. Hanks
& John L. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 249 (1970); Burton C. Kross,
Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 81, 84–85 (1972);
LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 48–49 (noting that Aspinall also wanted a “no change in
authority” clause but lost the fight); LIROFF, supra note 8, at 26–30.
169. Finn, supra note 47, at 504–05.
170. 115 CONG. REC. 29,051 (1969). Although Muskie’s support for the Office on
Environmental Quality would be created in the Environmental Improvement Act of 1970, it
was never invoked by the President and fell by the wayside. The Environmental Quality
Improvement Act, passed in 1970, created a support staff for CEQ and recognized the
existence of a national policy for the environment. Environmental Quality Improvement Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 114; see Kalen, supra note 37, at 497; Sauchuk, supra
note 82. The Clean Air Act had a similar provision canonizing NEPA. Clean Air Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
171. LINDSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 158 n.39 (noting maturely that Senate Bill 1075
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These points of compromise were presented to the Senate on October 8, 1969.172
Introducing the amendments on the Senate floor, Muskie laid out his broader strategy
of what the revised NEPA could achieve: “By development of meaningful methods
of measurement of environmental impact, through development of standards-setting
procedures at the local level, through careful analysis of existing and future land uses,
we can begin to order our progress without environmental chaos.”173 Here, Muskie
outlined his general skepticism for agency self-policing—the linchpin philosophy
tying together “detailed statements,” consideration of alternatives, public and
interagency review, and environmental agency supremacy:
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or
license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing
environmental quality legislation. In hearing after hearing agencies of the
Federal Government have argued that their primary authorization,
whether it be maintenance of the navigable waters by the Corps of
Engineers or licensing of nuclear powerplants by the Atomic Energy
Commission, takes precedence over water quality requirements.
I repeat, these agencies have always emphasized their primary
responsibility making environmental considerations secondary in their
view.
....
The proposed compromise language developed for section 102(c)
clearly indicates the extent to which the polluter is involved in
determining environmental effects. This language eliminated the
requirement that a “finding” be made but provides that environmental
impact be discussed as a part of any report on legislation, or any decision
to commence a major activity. The requirement that established
environmental agencies be consulted and that their comments
accompany any such report would place the environmental control
responsibility where it should be.174
At the time, few recognized the power of the Public Works compromise language,
and Section 102 received very little attention during conference.175 Opponents of the
bill, however, seemed more attuned to what the new language might mean.
Congressman Wayne Aspinall, who had sought to weaken the bill in conference
committee, aptly called the revised Section 102 a “new handle for

previously “arrogantly” referred the annual reports only to Interior Committee).
172. 115 CONG. REC. 29,050 (1969).
173. Id. at 29,053.
174. Id.
175. Finn, supra note 47, at 530. Finn notes that conferees believed the new language,
including a mandate for “detailed statements,” was “simple and self-evident.” Id. at 531. That
the new Section 102 was overlooked in conference may best be explained by the fact that
Senator Muskie and others—those closest to the new language—were not appointed as
conferees. In other words, Jackson, eager to bypass controversy, did not attempt to
communicate Muskie’s point of view. Id. at 547. For more on conference amendments, see id.
at 532–39.
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environmentalists.”176 William Harsha, a member of the House Public Works
Committee, warned:
[T]hat they should be on guard against the ramifications of a measure
that is so loose and ambiguous as this.
....
. . . [T]his is a major revision of the administrative functions of the U.S.
Government . . . .
....
The impact of S. 1075, if it becomes law, I am convinced would be so
wide sweeping as to involve every branch of the Government, every
committee of Congress, every agency, and every program of the
Nation.177
He was proven right.
A few outside of Congress also sounded the alarm about what the new bill might
mean. For example, Time magazine claimed that if NEPA became law, its impact
might be felt by “every imaginable special interest—airlines, highway builders,
mining companies, [and] real estate developers,” and that all federal policies with
environmental implications would be open to challenge.178
Despite these alarms, the post-conference bill was treated the same as the earlier
versions—rushed through the approval process of both the House and Senate with
neither a substantive debate nor a roll call vote.179
***
This untold history of NEPA challenges us to think about the tools jurists use to
dissect legislative history. Would the canons frequently employed by courts help
jurists parse out accurately the meaning of Section 102, recognizing aspects of the
record that Muskie fought for? Or would the methods of investigation lead courts to
overlook Muskie and to focus on Jackson and his committee’s brief, perfunctory
statements of findings (and downplay the contributions of the Public Works
Committee)? Senator Muskie and his staff are the unrecognized heroes of NEPA’s
legislative history. Reclaiming their central role rebuts recent efforts to gut NEPA

176. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 26–30 (“One staff proponent of Section 102 acknowledge[d]
that he was ‘one of the few individuals smart enough to see the possibility of procedural delay
deriving from the general provisions of Section 102.’”).
177. 115 CONG. REC. 40,927–28 (1969).
178. Policing the Polluters, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 42. See generally Ronald Lee Shelton,
The Environmental Era: A Chronological Guide to Policy and Concepts, 1962–1972 (May
1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (ProQuest).
179. LIROFF, supra note 8, at 30–31. With Muskie’s amendments now incorporated in
NEPA, his proposed Senate 7 bill seemed less important. It would die later that year in
conference after conferees from each chamber of Congress failed to reconcile their bills. Three
years later, Senate Bill 7 would become the basis for Section 311 of the highly influential
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972. Interview with Thomas C. Jorling, supra note 63. The
Water Quality Improvement Act would thus become the third major water pollution bill to fail
passage since 1967, joining Senate Bill 2760 in 1967 and Senate Bill 3206 in 1968.
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and maintain the functionality of the EIS. Jackson, Caldwell, and even Hong Kong
sunsets, by contrast, are not going to get us there.
III. INTERPRETING NEPA: ASSESSING EXTRINSIC SOURCE CANONS
Almost all episodes in the legislative history that help illuminate a nuanced and
enduring interpretation of “detailed statement” are the product of Muskie and his
staff. The trouble is that the most commonly consulted evidence of NEPA’s
legislative history is generally limited to Jackson.
Our research offers a valuable opportunity. Because we know the real legislative
history of NEPA, we can put canons of legislative history to the test—examining
which details they emphasize and which they conceal. More importantly, it allowed
us to test which of the canons or interpretive approaches proved most accurate and
helpful.
In major NEPA cases, the complex history of Section 102 has yet to be
considered. Although Calvert Cliffs is the singular opinion which considers the
Muskie-Jackson compromise, it focuses primarily on Section 104.180 Even in cases
discussing Muskie’s language (such as the “alternatives” provision), the legislative
history is not discussed181 or, when it is, refers only to Jackson’s comments on the
conference committee report.182
In this Part, we show that traditional canons of statutory interpretation fail to
reveal the real legislative history of NEPA. This exercise is meaningful for two
reasons. The first is specific—if future administrations seek to weaken the
requirement for “detailed statements” or undercut Section 102, as the Trump
administration attempted to do, courts will turn to canons of interpretation to evaluate
whether this is permissible. The second is general—analyzing the canons’
performance for a known legislative history allows us to predict their accuracy and
usefulness more generally.
Our careful research into NEPA’s passage provides the opportunity to “ground
truth” statutory canons.183 NEPA is a particularly good vehicle to ground truth the

180. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., 449 F.2d
1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
181. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Marble Mountain
Audubon Soc’y v. Rice, 914 F. 2d 179 (9th Cir. 1990); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway,
524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
182. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 n.18 (1976) (citing S. REP. NO.
91–296, at 9 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 40,416, 40,419 (1969)) (defining “action-forcing”);
Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 401 n.12; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409 n.19 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 29,052–
53, 29,055, 29,058, 40,416 (1969)) (referring to Senator Jackson’s remarks to the point of the
EIS’s timing); Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 n.14 (1989) (citing
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 n.18 (1976)); Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v.
Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 115 CONG. REC. 40,420 (1969)); Nat,
Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ((“[T]he language of
the Section-by-Section Analysis presented by Senator Jackson, in charge of the legislation and
chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, in explaining and recommending approval of the
bill as agreed in conference.”) (citing 115 CONG. REC. 40,420 (1969)).
183. “Ground truthing,” simply put, is the activity of testing a theory or a model by
comparing its results with what is known on the ground. See, e.g., Jana Carp, “Ground-
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canons. Due to the Act’s significance, virtually all participants in the process have
spent the past fifty years recounting and analyzing the legislative process, providing
a considerable body of research sources. Additionally, despite its ostensible
simplicity, NEPA has proven tricky: academic attention is often directed towards
unfulfilled expectations behind the Act and,184 perhaps due to the degree to which
the Act is studied, taught, and written about, an oversimplified legislative history
shorthand has evolved (which means that there is a story to tell and a story to correct).
All this leads us to ask a number of questions. Why hasn’t more of the story been
unearthed? Would the traditional canons find the true story behind the “detailed
statements” requirement if the Trump administration regulations had been
challenged in a second term? And, given all this, what can we learn about the canons
from a theoretical perspective from this exercise? What real-world aspects of the
legislative process do they capture? Which do they overlook?
We apply the most commonly used or accepted canons and find that they fail to
uncover a complete picture of Section 102, including a nuanced picture of its
legislative intent. We do find, however, that alternative canons of legislative history
suggested by Professors Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast
(collectively referred to—even by themselves—as McNollgast) fares much better.
While McNollgast’s canons are commonly discussed among scholars, they are rarely
employed by jurists. The fact that a theory mainly discussed by scholars
outperformed canons embraced by judges raises an important challenge to the ways
that the judiciary approaches legislative history.
A. What Has Not Worked—Dominant Legislative History Canons
We recognize that the use of legislative histories to determine congressional intent
is, to use an understatement, not without its critics.185 However, for those jurists who
rely on legislative histories as an extrinsic source to interpret ambiguous186 statutes,

Truthing” Representations of Social Space: Using Lefebvre's Conceptual Triad, 28 J. PLAN.
EDUC. & RSCH. 129 (2008); George M. Garrity, Ground Truth, 29 STANDARDS GEONOMIC SCI.
91 (2009).
184. See supra note 37; Harvey Bartlett, Comment, Is NEPA Substantive Review Extinct,
or Merely Hibernating? Resurrecting NEPA Section 102(1), 13 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 411 (2000).
185. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Resort to ‘intent’ [by
using legislative history] . . . has no more force than [an] opinion poll [of Congress].”); see
also Miller v. Comm’r, 836 F.2d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 1988); John F. Manning, Textualism
as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); W. David Slawson, Legislative
History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 383 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998); Note,
Justice Scalia’s Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress
Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 160-75 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY passim (1997).
186. The key word here being ambiguous, i.e., vague. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 17–71 (2d ed. 2013); Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S.
562, 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those who [would] take it into account, is meant to
clear up ambiguity, not create it.”); See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
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legislative history canons are indispensable tools, acting as rules of thumb to identify
details or narrative sequences considered most important or consequential in
determining Congress’ intents or purposes. Employing a structured (at times
hierarchical) toolkit of legislative historical analysis is meant to introduce rigor to
historical reading and to protect jurists against the sort of folly Judge Leventhal aptly
described when he likened choosing aspects of legislative history to “looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends.”187 For these reasons, statutory canons are a core
part of any “Leg/Reg” class in law school. Below, we consider the two major families
of traditional extrinsic source canons—those of source and person, which also
dominate those NEPA cases which refer to legislative history.188
1. Hierarchy of Sources Canons
The most common genre of canons suggests a loose hierarchy of historical source
categories. In this line of thinking, given the broad range of materials typically
considered part of what can be extensive legislative histories of statutes,189 certain
types of documents or reports ought to take precedence over others, assumed to be
more informative, legitimate, or conclusive.190
It is generally accepted in hierarchies of source canons that committee reports
occupy the top of the pyramid.191 This is the case for a number of reasons. First,

(1947); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937); Fairport, Painesville & E.R.R. Co.
v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Vindicator Consol. Gold
Mining Co., 284 U.S. 231 (1931).
187. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. See supra note 182.
189. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 972 (4th ed.
2007) (citing OTTO HETZEL, MICHAEL LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW &
PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 2001)) (providing a checklist of materials to be considered in a legislative
history).
190. MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 173 (“[T]here has traditionally been a rough
hierarchy of legislative history sources, with committee reports at the top, sponsor statements
somewhere in the middle, and other statements in floor debates and hearings closer to the
bottom.”); see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 116, 124–26 (2008).
191. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 981; MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 136–37;
see Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982); J.P. Chamberlain, The
Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (1933) (“[I]t is fair to assume that
Congress has adopted as its intent the intent of the committee.”); James M. Landis, A Note on
“Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888–89 (1930); Harry Willmer Jones,
Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 969 (1940); see also
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969);
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 & n.3 (1984); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex
rel. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 591
(1978); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 98 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); SEC v.
Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935). But see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
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committee reports are written by more than a single member of Congress and are
assumed to be reported only with the consent of the committee. By relying on
consensus-driven sources, jurists employing legislative histories to construct
statutory meaning hope to deflect arguments that Congress is incapable of speaking
in a single voice or articulating a single intention.192 Even though they lack the
authority of a roll-call vote in which every legislator participates, committee reports
are thus thought to represent the voice or intent of at least a relevant legislative subgroup. As the ultimate and most authoritative legislative subgroup, the conference
committee and its report are generally viewed as the tip of the spear in terms of
documentary history.193
Because a committee is more than just a collection of legislators, a second
rationale for paying particular deference to conference committee reports is that it is
assumed that committees are made up of conferees who are closest to the bill in
question.194 After all, conferees will be members of the sponsoring committee who
introduced, considered, and reported the bills to the floor. Why wouldn’t they be
most familiar with the legislation, and why wouldn’t their stated intentions be the
most meaningful? Conferees help reconcile conflicting bills between chambers,
finalize the bill, and engage in the complex processes of persuasion and compromise
sufficient to move the bill to passage.195 In this way, a hierarchy of sources that
prioritizes conference committee reports incorporates the basic philosophies and
assumptions of hierarchies of person.196
A final reason that jurists give particular weight to committee reports is that these
reports are crafted carefully because they are “circulated . . . [with] a bill . . . to
Members . . . and their staff.”197 It is not only the formality of the communication
that matters, but also that the recipient of the communications is the whole or
chamber of Congress—more recipients implies greater buy-in and greater loadbearing capacity for the intentions of the larger Congress.198 The timing of the
communication is extremely relevant, it is provided at the time the whole of Congress
or a chamber is asked to consider the language of the bill.199 The committee report
attempts to explain to congressional colleagues what a bill does and what it will mean

Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Hirschey v. FERC,
777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works, 66 DUKE
L.J. 979, 981 (2017) (citing MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF
ACTING TOGETHER (2014)); MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE
SOCIAL WORLD (2014); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us,
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 446–47 (1990).
193. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 982.
194. Id.
195. See id.; Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 209 (2000); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516
U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
196. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 982.
197. Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
198. MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 136–37. But see Doerfler, supra note 192, at 982.
199. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 136–37.
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to enact it, implying a straightforward articulation of intent and purpose to fellow
legislators who may be less familiar with the technical details of legislation.
Less persuasive sources of historical materials (listed loosely in the order of
importance) include sponsor statements,200 statements by individual speakers
directed to a chamber during a floor debate,201 rejected draft language,202 and finally
statements on the record during committee hearings,203 or elsewhere.204 The general
trajectory is clear—sources with smaller audiences or further from the final passage
of the bill are downplayed.

200. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 1000 (“Next to committee reports, the most
persuasive legislative materials are explanations of statutory meanings, and compromises
reached to achieve enactment, by the sponsors and floor managers of the legislation.”). For
examples of courts relying on the hierarchy of such materials, see Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704–05 (1995) (giving most weight to a
committee report followed by a floor manager statement); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 626 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Pa. 1993) (giving weight
to a committee report and inferences from a bill amendment); Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d
623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (relying mostly on committee reports and some on a floor
debate).
201. MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 139–41 (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 503–04 (1982)); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 262
n.36 (1975); Harry Willmer Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737,
751–52 (1940); Thomas W. Merrill, Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1014 (1992); Murphy v. Kenneth Cole
Prods., Inc., 115 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2007); Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 960 P.2d
513 (Cal. 1998); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 1020; NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); BankAmerica Co. v. United States, 462
U.S. 122 (1983); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237–42 (1984).
202. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67 (1988); see JOHN M. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 25 (1981); ESKRIDGE ET
AL., supra note 189, at 1026; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 577–80 (2006); Pattern
Makers’ League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
203. Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1131–32 (1983); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 1020; MANNING
ET AL., supra note 186, at 141; see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 n.13 (1986); S &
E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 236–37 (1986).
204. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 579 (1995); Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 532 (1972); NLRB v. Local 103, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 347 n.9 (1978); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 629 n.8 (1975); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S.
490, 492 (1945); Dickerson, supra note 203, at 1131; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at
1043–47 (commenting on presidential signing statements); MANNING ET AL., supra note 186,
at 141; see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 51 n.13; S & E Contractors, Inc., 406 U.S. at 13 n.9;
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 61; Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 236–37. See
generally Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President’s Place in
“Legislative History,” 89 MICH. L. REV. 399 (1990).
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2. Hierarchy of Persons Canons
Nestled within the first canon structure, a hierarchy of persons is consulted when
consensus-driven materials are insufficient.205 When statutory language is
ambiguous or unclear, this hierarchy of persons would prioritize the views of some
individuals before others.206 The basic assumption behind such a hierarchy is
relatively straightforward—that is, the more prominent an individual is in guiding a
bill through the legislative procedures, the more their perspective counts, since they
understand the bill or its context better or, alternatively, they worked their views into
the bill.207 Determinations of importance during the legislative process tend to be
prescriptive rather than descriptive, highlighting certain categories of legislators by
position or rank. Bill sponsors in particular have been pointed to in times of statutory
ambiguity.208
Following sponsors, the canons suggest that other important actors in a legislative
history (listed at least loosely in order of relative importance) include committee
chairs, committee members, and other congressional leaders. The less important
players are all other legislators and back benchers,209 those in the losing coalition,210
and those who are not members of Congress, including staffers211 and those in the

205. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
206. MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 138; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision
Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 119–
27 (2012).
207. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 98 (1953) (“Whatever we may think about the
loose use of legislative history, it has never been questioned that reports of committees and
utterances of those in charge of legislation constitute authoritative exposition of the meaning
of legislation.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 638
(1990); Jacobus tenBroek, Admissibility of Congressional Debates in Statutory Construction
by the United States Supreme Court, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326, 329 n.20 (1937); ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 189, at 1000. But see William Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned
Colloquy and Its Effect in the Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J. 1314, 1314 (1959)
(leveraging a critique about “planned colloquies” that might be rightly leveraged against
Senator Jackson and Lynton Caldwell during the April Hearings on S. 1075).
208. Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 394–95 (“It is the sponsors that [the Courts] look to
when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.”); see also MANNING ET AL., supra note
186, at 141 (“The Court has described the views of sponsors or floor managers as weighty, or
even authoritative.”).
209. Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 155 P.3d 284, 292–93 (Cal. 2007); Quelimane
Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 960 P.2d 513, 529 n.9 (Cal. 1998); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 189, at 1000; MANNING ET AL., supra note 186, at 138–39.
210. Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1176 (2011).
211. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 857–58 (1984); Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 223 (1979); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 1018; see also
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 836 (1991). See generally Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128–29 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Negonsott v.
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106–09 (1993); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125 & n.7 (1991);
Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 484–85 (1981); Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549,
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federal bureaucracy.212
Although such hierarchies are not always rigid in rank, they seem to rely on
assumptions of consistency—in order for such a view to be cogent, bill sponsors or
committee chairs tend to occupy certain roles in the legislative process, which we
can assume are fairly consistent. Therefore, rank is correlated with influence exerted;
and knowing a legislator’s role in the bill’s ecosystem allows us to know something
about their interaction with the bill’s language, intent, or purpose and thus defer to
(or disregard) them appropriately.
Traditional application of source hierarchy canons would have us turn first to the
Senate and conference committee reports, as the courts have done in the past.213 The
conference report, however, tells us little about the ideology driving earlier
amendments introducing Section 102’s key language—“detailed statements,”
“alternatives,” and interagency review. Its treatment of the new language found in
Section 102 is very sparse. Nothing is said in the report about how those changes
came to be. This is not surprising since they were not the result of committee
deliberations. There is no hint of Muskie’s role in the amendments, the ideological
differences that threatened the passage of the bill, or even the existence of a
controversy in the first place. In discussing Section 102, what the conference report
does focus on is unhelpful.214
Next, in the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee’s report on Senate Bill
1075, we find outdated Section 102 language mandating only “findings” and lacking
key provisions. From the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, we

558–59 (1981); Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1994); Alison C. Giles,
Note, The Value of Nonlegislators’ Contributions to Legislative History, 79 GEO. L.J. 359
(1990); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014) (stating that the judicial take on staff’s role is
oversimplified); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222
(1994) (stating that nonlegislator statements occupy no place of honor and are considered
among the least authoritative sources).
212. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside
- An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66
STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 (2014); Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of
the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 454 (2017);
Jarrod Shobe, Agency Legislative History, 68 EMORY L.J. 283, 286 (2018); Shobe, supra note
211, at 863–64; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79,
131–32 (2015); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1378–79 (2017).
213. In fact, these are close to the only documents relied upon in NEPA’s legislative
history. See supra note 182.
214. H.R. REP. NO. 91-765, at 8–10 (1969). This problem is neither unforeseen nor totally
unheard of, of course. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 982. The report discusses that
the new NEPA requirements allow state and local governments to provide comments on
environmental impact statements (a product of Muskie’s intervention). The committee notes
that seeking these comments should not “unreasonably delay the processing of Federal
proposals” and envisions that state and local agencies would monitor the Federal Register,
identify proposals of interest, and then request that federal entities provide “supplementary
information” upon request. If there ever was a failed prognosis of an enactment’s future, it was
this one.
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find no Section 102 analogue whatsoever. If we were to consider floor statements as
the next most important source in the hierarchy, we risk being misled by appeals to
simplicity. In the legislative history of Senate Bill 1075, Muskie’s amendment of a
“detailed statement” is never explained on the floor, at least in floor sessions
discussing Jackson’s bill. This is not to say that the amendments were never
discussed on the Senate floor, however—only that the comments are entered instead
under Muskie’s separate bill, Senate Bill 7. Perhaps because it was filed under a
separate bill, significant NEPA decisions fail to refer to the critical October 8
compromise that introduced the “detailed statement” requirement.
Committee hearings yield only general discussions of “action-forcing” by Jackson
and Caldwell,215 showing only that some action had to be forced. The extent of the
action expected, however, is undefined. Two-page notices of finding, as committee
drafters assumed would result,216 are actions and thus might not unreasonably be
considered a fulfillment of the committee’s “action-forcing” ideals. “Detailed
statements” might be understood to be a one-to-one substitute for findings, as there
are no grounds in the legislative history to read into the new language a different
value set. What if this were the reading taken by the courts had the Trump
administration’s limits on page limits been challenged? It is, after all, all that might
be found or prioritized using traditional source canons. These sources also do not
speak to a meaningful need for public review or citizen suits, as these were not a
primary concern of the traditionally centered framers of NEPA. Strict timelines or
restricted access to scientific research might affect interagency review or public
scrutiny of proposed government actions.
Although deemed less important by the hierarchy of sources canons, a canon
focused on rejected language217 would have proven much more helpful in
constructing meaning from Section 102. Comparing the weaker “finding” language
with the stronger revised “detailed statement” language at least tips us off that an
amendment was made and might provide some sense of trajectory. It does not,
however, explain how that language came to be, nor does it tell us where to look.
Was the amendment made under the assumption that the new language was
synonymous with the old? That it would better reflect the intent of the bill sponsor?
Or, on the other hand, did it reflect some controversy and a shift of meaning or
statutory purpose? Not all amendments are introduced for the same reason, and only
so much can be deduced from language swaps without further context. None of the
prioritized sources in a traditional source hierarchy serve to answer these questions,
and it is left up to judges to decide—perhaps arbitrarily.
Would a court determine that, in many ways, the “detailed statement” was not
addressed and that we should therefore assume that “detailed” meant something not

215. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 144.
217. See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935); Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 220 (1983); Busic v.
United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 n.11 (1980); United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144,
155 (1932); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873 (1930). But see
Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 261–63 (1945); REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 160 (1975).
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all that detailed—given the dog that didn’t bark canon?218 Many scholars and other
experts have opined that had Congress understood the impact that NEPA would have
on the legal landscape, it would not have passed in the first place.219 However, even
on Senate Bill 1075’s record, some dogs did bark.220 Still, it is imaginable that, as
Dreyfus (one of Jackson’s staffers) later argued, the future NEPA litigants might
argue that Congress got it wrong and, in so doing, transformed a modest legislative
vehicle into a runaway train.221 While Jackson, Dreyfus, and others may have not
seen what Muskie saw in the language he proposed, Muskie saw them as significant.
That the canons do not point to Muskie—such a fundamental part of NEPA’s
history—as having a major role in crafting the enactment is, of course, worrisome
both for the future NEPA litigation and for the soundness of reliance on these canons
in the first place.
Much like canons of source hierarchy, canons referring to a hierarchy of persons
fail to identify the most important processes in making Section 102. In a traditional
hierarchy, the legislator introduces the key amendments in question; but in this case,
pivotal portions of Section 102 occupied no place of honor. After all, Muskie was
not a bill sponsor, a member of the relevant committee, or in the general party
leadership. In much the same way, staffers, despite their role in actually proposing
and defending key language, are often excluded by formal interpretations of
congressional operation.
Canons of persons hierarchy rely too optimistically that leadership implies
involvement, engagement, or understanding, or that congressional structures reflect
actual legislative processes. NEPA may be aberrant in that its legislation involved,
perhaps to an unusual degree, inter-committee engagement and informal
amendments. But empirical research published elsewhere suggests that variances
from the “norm” of congressional procedure might be, in many cases, the norm.222
Strictly applying such a canon, NEPA is understood to be of the product of Jackson—
he was NEPA’s sponsor in the Senate, Interior Committee chair, and led the Senate
conference delegation. Focusing on Jackson and ignoring Muskie is problematic not
only because the language of the most important provision of NEPA was Muskie’s
in the first place, but also because Jackson did little to highlight the changes to
Section 102. If we only look for his statements, we will come up with the same
general “action-forcing” found in the April 16 hearings.223 In a floor speech, Jackson

218. See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189, at 1020–21, 1035.
219. See supra note 18.
220. See supra note 176–177 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 167.
222. See Bressman et al., supra note 212; Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa
Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015);
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—an
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); Nourse, supra note 206, at 77; Shobe, supra note 211.
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 672–73 (1999) (noting that empirical testing does not necessarily
answer to normative disagreement underlying application of the canons or legislative history).
223. See supra note 47.
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mentioned that he had cooperated with Muskie to change some of the language but
added that he did not consider the changes as very significant,224 calling the Muskie
amendments “minor changes.”225
Without directly giving or taking credit for the changes in Section 102, Jackson
said the revised NEPA would “apply pressure . . . on those agencies that have an
impact on the environment” and that the “strong language” is aimed at making “those
agencies . . . become environment[ally] conscious.”226 Forcing action—any action—
should create internal reform. If it does not, the Court is not bound to demand more
action. Muskie spoke more directly of the need to change behavior by external
pressure stemming from disclosure, implying a more demanding impact statement
process and interagency policing.227 Interestingly, in Calvert Cliffs, Judge Skelly
Wright notes and then brushes off how the changes to Section102 came to be. Doing
so, he does not compare the Senate-passed language to the final version. Rather, and
exemplifying the risk of relying on a hierarchy of persons, he quotes Jackson’s
characterization of the changes Muskie insisted upon as leaving the “substance . . .
relatively unchanged,”228 noting that “Senator Muskie seemed to give greater
emphasis to the supposed conflict between the two bills.”229 By deferring to Jackson,
Judge Wright confuses the origins and intent of critical language. He fails to
comprehend the conflict that threatened to sink the bill and, in essence, ascribes
Muskie’s more stringent, action-forcing agency expectations to Jackson.

***
Reliance on hierarchies of person and canon exemplify NEPA case law discussing
the Act’s legislative history.230 Overall, the traditional canons do not explain the
actual history of NEPA’s passage very well and narrow our view to the brief,
incomplete explanations of “action forcing” offered in the Senate and conference
reports and, when in doubt, citing only Jackson’s celebratory comments after
conference committee—consistent with NEPA’s early case law.231 Relying on source
hierarchy canons points us towards sources that either fail to reveal the source and
procedure of amendments, or that otherwise do not provide any commentary on the
intent or purpose of the amendments. Hierarchies of person rely on overly simplistic
models of congressional rules and procedure and fail to consider persons who were
actually critical to the statutory language as passed, leaving unexplored significant
troves of information that could explain why language was introduced or what it was
supposed by its drafters to mean. It would have us downplay Muskie’s view of
environmental impact statements and interagency review altogether, and totally
prioritize Jackson, whose “action-forcing” mechanism was optimistic and poorly

224. 115 CONG. REC. 29,053, 40,425.
225. 115 CONG. REC. 40,417.
226. 115 CONG. REC. 40,425.
227. Id. at 29,053.
228. Id. at 29,055.
229. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Com., 449 F.2d
1109, 1125–26 n.37 (1971).
230. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 182.
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defined. Using the history of NEPA to ground truth common canons of construction
provides a case study demonstrating their potential shortcomings in practice.
Knowing all this is not just important because of what it tells us about the canons,
but also because of what it tells us about the work future litigants will need to take
on in order to get courts to focus on the most vital aspects of the legislative history
relevant to the “detailed statement” language (and those passages of the legislative
history which lend themselves to a favorable outcome).
With this in mind, we searched alternative canons for a more flexible and
adaptable approach which could adapt to NEPA’s unique legislative circumstances.
B. What Might Protect NEPA—Positive “Veto Gates” Canons
The most promising discrete canons we found came not from the legal academy
proper but from the world of positive political theory (although these canons are no
strangers to Legislation casebooks). Professors Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll,
and Barry Weingast, all prominent political scientists, have transcended
coauthorship: as the positive political science boy band of our time, they are known
by the mononym McNollgast. To be fair, the collective name is much more than a
gimmick. Together, they are well-published and prolific. Their ideas have frequently
proven important enough to watchers of congressional politics that their scholarship
and empirical work have sparked a new genre of canons.
In their article, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, McNollgast propose a number of interpretive canons of legislative
histories.232 McNollgast argue that, instead of focusing on hierarchies of source,
person, or time, judges should employ a different lens when parsing legislative
history—one that instead tracks “the major lines of compromise” that “result from
bargains among veto players in the legislative process.”233 This is a functional
analysis, one that focuses on which specific players had the descriptive potential to
stop (and therefore shape) a piece of legislation through compromises that allow the
legislation to pass through imposed “veto gates.”234
Though not formally referred to as a power of veto, McNollgast extend insights
of presidential-congressional politics235 into those situations where a member or

232. McNollgast, supra note 222. See also Rodriguez et al., supra note 14, at 1438–39.
233. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 706–07, 736 (“Statutes are most assuredly not
embodiments of the objectives of any particular person, but a compromise among numerous
political actors.”); see Rodriguez et al., supra note 14, at 1442. 707. But see Nourse, supra
note 210, at 1155–58.
234. See also William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 756, 773 (2012); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008).
235. Perhaps the idea that motivated McNollgast’s veto gates more than any other is the
idea embedded in the traditional canons used to parse legislative history that gives very little
weight to statements of a president. McNollgast argue that, because a President has the power
of the veto, their preferences have to be taken seriously by members of Congress. Out of this
insight grows their threat of presidential veto canon, requiring that when a court is examining
a meaning of a statute, courts should take presidential statements “into account and must
accord them considerable weight if the President possessed a credible veto threat over the
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members of Congress have the ability to exercise the functional veto or sink a bill.
They write that:
[t]he single most important feature of the legislative process is that, to succeed,
a bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates in both the House and Senate, each
of which is guarded by members of the relevant chamber who were chosen by
their peers to supervise that particular gate.236
Rather than lend credence to individuals in the legislative process based on their
formal role, “positive political theory points to the members who control the various
veto gates as crucial to understanding legislative intent.”237 From this focus,
McNollgast teases out a number of other “veto gate”-derived canons that could be
used as a hierarchy to structure inquiry into legislative history, three of which we
consider here.238 All of these positive canons sort details based on the extent to which,
functionally speaking, they relate to legislation’s traversal of conflict in the form of
vetoes, whether formal or informal.
The first positive canon we consider is the consequential statements canon, which
tries to separate consequential statements from “cheap talk.”239 What makes
statements consequential is their relationship to veto gates and pivotal points.240 Do
these sources or statements explain the rationale behind the levying of a veto gate?
Do they explain the rationale behind amendments which insure safe passage through
a potential block? Using this lens as a sorting device, the canon provides that
“consequential statements and actions have priority over inconsequential ones.”241 In
other words, information about how veto gates were navigated is more meaningful
and provides richer inferences of intent and purpose than cheap talk alone: “When
talk is cheap—when members of Congress or the President cannot be held
accountable for their statements about a bill by members of the coalition—its
information content is not reliable.”242 Colloquies offered before a settled chamber
should not be given the same weight as tense negotiations between conflicting
factions, for example.243 Because pivotal legislators and gatekeepers have “the

statute in question.” McNollgast, supra note 222, at 737.
236. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 720, 735; McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note
14, at 18.
237. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 707.
238. The remaining canon relates to presidential veto gates proper. Id. at 707–08. Even
though a opposition to the Senate NEPA bill was floated early on in the Nixon White House,
it was never publicized. By the time Muskie’s amendments to Section 102 materialized, the
differences between the Nixon administration and Congress had largely been reconciled as the
Nixon administration acquiesced on earlier objections.
239. Rodriguez et al., supra note 14, at 1445–56. Worse than “cheap talk,” statements of
winners can be “[smuggled] in” or even be misleading. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 189,
at 983.
240. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 731.
241. Id. at 707.
242. Id.; see also id. at 727 (“[O]nly when the majority is in a position to sanction such talk
should it be considered relevant for statutory interpretation, and then only to the extent that it
(statements, reports) is not directly contradicted by action (i.e., by voting behavior).”).
243. See Legislative Intent, supra note 14, at 21–22.
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strongest incentives to communicate reliably the act’s meaning,” their statements
should be lent due credence as signals of meaning.244 The consequential statements
and compromises that come out of these negotiations might be regarded as
agreements, much like contracts, between the parties to allow the bill to pass through
the gate.245
The second positive canon is the functional relationship canon, which asks judges
to look past the title or position that players in drafting congressional legislation have
and rather to focus on the “totality of the legislative history conveys important
information about whose preferences were most consequential in shaping the
coalitional agreement.”246 Who controls the veto gates is an empirical question
answered by considering ground conditions—it may commonly be correlated with
official leadership positions and roles, but not necessarily.247 Regardless of title,
“veto players” should be granted particular deference.248
Third, McNollgast also considers a rejected language canon (also considered
among the more traditional canons), which dictates that “decisions by legislators to
reject language provide useful negative inferences about statutes.”249 While courts at
times rely on rejected proposals as part of the traditionally applied canons,250 the
reason that positive political science considers rejected language is because rejected
language tells us a good deal about the negotiations engaged in to pass through
various veto gates.251 In other words, McNollgast is interested in rejected language
because it is revelatory of conflict and, by implication, threats of delay or veto.
Interestingly, McNollgast has briefly commented on NEPA and Wright’s Calvert
Cliffs in a positive political theory context before.252 Drawing on a more developed
set of historical artifacts, and considering more than Calvert Cliffs, we expand on
their analysis and three of their proposed positive canons. In doing so, we find that
they are much more helpful than the traditionally applied canons in bringing into
focus the most consequential moments of NEPA’s legislative history. Analyzing

244. Rodriguez et al., supra note 14, at 1448. See also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra
note 186, at 175 (citing Nourse, supra note 206, at 70).
245. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 708 (“Writing statutes shares many similarities with
writing contracts. Both formalize bargains among actors with diverse and partially conflicting
interests. In the legislative process, as in the marketplace, actions happen only when bargains
are struck. Further, in both cases bargaining is costly.”); id. at 727.
246. Id. at 708. See also Tiefer, supra note 195, at 267 (“Courts interpret the choices
actually made in Congress, not just the ones made by idealized processes. For legislative
history to give a distorted view, committee reporting must diverge not from the idealized
chamber, but from the actual enactment process of the text.”).
247. See McNollgast, supra note 222, at 736.
248. Id. at 707 (“The preferences of veto players are most influential in determining policy
bargains, and, therefore, their preferences must be ascertained in order to uncover the implicit
agreement underlying the explicit statutory language.”).
249. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 736.
250. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 186, at 142–43.
251. See McNollgast, supra note 222, at 725–26 (“It follows that interpretations of a statute
derived from proposed amendments and alternatives that were rejected at various veto gates
cannot become part of a valid statutory interpretation.”).
252. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Com., 449 F.2d
1109, 1125–26 n.37 (1971).
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legislative developments and players by relationship to conflict (rather than formal
procedure) seems to provide positive canons greater flexibility when applied to
unorthodox lawmaking.253 The fact that an alternative set of canons performs better
than the traditional canons, of course, raises important implications for the durability
and utility of traditional canons.
First, the path of Senate Bill 1075 immediately following passage did, in fact, face
a legitimate veto gate. Because Jackson’s Senate bill passed the Senate through the
consent calendar, Muskie was forced to resort to a hold as his only means of blocking
the bill’s passage to bring it back to the Senate for further consideration. Using the
parlance of positive canons, Muskie imposed his own veto gate since Jackson had
bypassed the appropriate gate by putting Senate Bill 1075 on the consent calendar.254
Since such a st ay is an informal move arranged with the Senate Majority Leader,
however, it does not appear on the Congressional Record (or the session’s daily
digest) and is not reflected in traditionally consulted sources. Muskie did not have an
absolute veto; rather he could demand reconsideration of the bill by the Senate and
force a vote. Bringing the bill back to the Senate would necessitate senator resources
(e.g., floor time), would have likely caused controversy, and might have ended up
sinking the bill.255
During this period, with Muskie acting as a gatekeeper, NEPA was renegotiated
and emerged from the gate substantially different, particularly in its Section 102.
Jackson needed Muskie’s buy-in to navigate the veto gate, and concessions or
amendments introduced here tell us more about this power struggle than do
statements or amendments made afterwards, when the threat of veto was diminished.
Thus, what happened during this period is consequential. By understanding this
significant period, we know where to look for hints of momentous statements as they
might be reflected in other sources, such as the floor proceedings of the October 8
compromise; presentation of the new Senate Bill 1075;256 or Muskie’s contemporary
writing on the issue,257 where he spells out an intentionality of Section 102, which
seems to preclude the interpretation offered by CEQ in today’s proposed regulations.
All of this is much more significant than Jackson’s “cheap talk” after the most critical
veto gates have been passed, and at which point he can safely downplay Muskie’s
contributions without threat.258 It is the statements that occurred during intercommittee negotiations through the veto gate that are consequential. Once the veto
gate is passed, talk is again cheap.
By understanding consequential periods and statements using the first positive
canon, we can gain a better understanding of operative bargaining coalitions and
actors. McNollgast asks us to think about power dynamics realistically. In this canon,
we do not consider the formal position or title of certain members, but rather the
extent to which an individual’s preference is necessarily taken into account because

253. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 222, at 1789.
254. See supra note 101–103. In fact, Jackson seems to have been eager to short circuit the
process as much as possible to avoid a challenge to his bill.
255. Finn, supra note 47, at 460–61, 470.
256. See 115 CONG. REC. 29,046–65.
257. See Muskie et al., supra note 29. See also Finn, supra note 47.
258. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,420. For cases relying on “cheap talk” rather than
consequential statements, see supra note 182.
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or due to their relationship to a veto gate. While Muskie was not a bill sponsor,
committee chair, party leader, or even member of the bill’s committee, Muskie
possessed the functional ability to upend Senate Bill 1075 as he leveraged a hold on
the bill.
A positive canon of functional relationships prompts us to ask why Muskie had
the ability to create a veto gate in the first place, and what implications that might
have in interpreting NEPA.259 First, Muskie was able to convince Mansfield to
respect his requested hold because of the overlap between Senate Bill 1075 and his
own Senate Bill 7.260 Simply referring to this portion of the Congressional Record
(concerning Senate Bill 7) provides the reader with a reasonably straightforward (if
somewhat downplayed) explanation of Muskie’s Section 102 amendments. Second,
Muskie probably was able to put a stay on Senate Bill 1075 due to his general stature
in the Senate, particularly on environmental issues—he was, after all, “Mr. Clean.”261
Formal leadership considered under the hierarchy of persons canon is one thing, but
informal clout and “ownership” of certain legislative territories is another.
McNollgast’s second positive canon permits more flexible consideration of these
sorts of informal or title-less powers in Congress and is more helpful in pointing us
towards significant actors liable to exert influence on bills’ substance. Although
Jackson insists that his bill was not substantively affected by the Public Works
Committee,262 McNollgast asks us to consider conflict rather than to uncritically
defer to bill sponsors.
Knowing why Muskie was able to put a hold on Senate Bill 1075 prompts us to
give greater weight to Muskie’s legislative intents and broader regulatory
worldview263 and allows us to contextualize the implied purpose behind the new
Muskie language—agencies cannot be trusted to navigate the impact analysis process
by themselves, neither should they be given broad discretion in disclosing or
withholding information. Agencies have to lay it all out—anything that might be
relevant—and let other agencies and the public review or litigate as appropriate. A
focus on Muskie also centers Muskie’s “standard-setting” approach more generally
and supports a view of a toothy, requirements-created and agency-forcing section
102.
By understanding the general points of view at play, we come to better understand
the implicit agreements264 met in the amended Section 102 language and a more
general concession to Muskie’s regulatory point of view. A conflict-oriented positive
canon set thus reframes Section 102 as an agreement between Jackson and Muskie.

259. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 725.
260. See supra note 78.
261. See Daniels et al., supra note 60, at Part I.
262. See supra note 222-223 and accompanying text.
263. See generally Legislative Intent, supra note 14.
264. McNollgast, supra note 222, at 718 (“[T]he policy bargain among members of the
enacting coalition consists of both an explicit statement of this agreement (e.g., in the text of
the resulting statute) and implicit agreements over ambiguous provisions and how the explicit
bargain will be applied to unforeseen circumstances . . . Because the coalition’s agreements
represent a compromise among its members, the ascertainment of an implied agreement rests
on understanding what interests were compromised—that is, who actually can be regarded as
a member of the enacting coalition.”).
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Rather than force action through research and findings alone, this section became a
means of policing agency actions with review by other sectors of government and
the public. In this light, imposing strict deadlines and dramatically constricting the
volume of information and alternatives reported through page limits seem contrary
to legislative intent. Mandating seventh-percentile-detailed statements hardly seems
acceptable in light of the deal Muskie struck in order to avoid “meager,” “minimal”
requirements for agencies.265 Although Jackson, Dreyfus, and other Interior
Committee drafters might not have objected to the harshly limited EISs, theirs is not
necessarily the intent that matters. Using the framing of positive canons, intent is
defined by bargaining outcomes and, in this case, should be dominated by the
expectations of Muskie and the Public Works Committee.
Simply put, Section 102, read as a Muskie-Jackson agreement, unmarred by
Jackson’s narrative sideling Muskie,266 does not support the sort of streamlining put
forward by the Trump administration. By locking out science altogether or hiding
information in appendices that sit in agencies’ file drawers, agencies become their
own police, and the public loses its leverage to intervene in the courts. NEPA is as it
is today, however, because a veto gate was foisted for the express purpose of
avoiding this issue.
Muskie matters, especially when it comes to drawing meaning from Section
102 using positive political theory. Without his exercising a veto gate, it seems
unlikely that NEPA would have ushered in a new era of environmental law. Rather,
it would have likely been a bill that would have been appropriate to pass on the
consent calendar, one that the press would have hardly covered, and one that Nixon—
no matter how cynical he was about pushing environmental legislation on the sole
basis of political gain—would have celebrated at a signing ceremony without regret.
Interestingly, one of the only traditional canons that we discussed above that
would have helped courts zero in on the story behind Section 102 is also the only
canon that McNollgast incorporate (though for different reasons) into their own
proposed canons—the rejected language canon.267 The reason that McNollgast have
us look at rejected language, however, is broader than just the linguistic differences
between different iterations of proposals. Rejected language also tells us something
about the fruits of compromise—the necessary negotiations that brought about
legislative bargains. While all of this is wrapped up in the other positive canons,
focusing on rejected language proved very useful in helping see not only what caused
Muskie to get off his perch, but also what gave him a perch in the first place.
***
The relative performance of the traditional and positive canons is illuminating.
We suspect, like the research in psychology focused on heuristics, the traditional
canons are likely to continue to lose traction and fall into disuse—the assumptions
that justified their use, if ever true, may be outmoded.268 In their place, evidence and
theory-based positive canons ought to be considered in the mainstream. The primary
challenge for the traditional canons in the context of NEPA is that Muskie was not a
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See supra note 116–117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 224–225 and accompanying text.
McNollgast, supra note 222, at 707.
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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formal mover pushing NEPA—rather, he worked largely in the background, using
his reputational clout and circumstantial leverage to impose a veto gate and force a
change in legislation through irregular channels. It also does not help that the relevant
compromise between Jackson and Muskie was memorialized in the Congressional
Record in the legislative history of a bill that was contemporaneous with NEPA but
not filed under Senate Bill 1075.
Should future administrations follow the lead of the Trump administration and
attempt to undermine Section 102, it is important to realize that the traditional canons
will fail to reveal the accurate legislative history.
CONCLUSION
Over fifty years since its passage, the real history of Section 102 of NEPA
deserves to be known—it is, after all, the reason NEPA is the most litigated statute
in all of environmental law. While Congress and a number of presidents have
attempted to weaken NEPA, the Act not only lives on but thrives. While correcting
the historical record is important in its own right, a better understanding of the history
raises significant questions about how this legislative history remained virtually
unknown. How have scholars, litigants, and jurists ignored the enactment’s nuanced
history for so long?
In the past, and much to the dismay of many NEPA advocates, substantive
requirements and NEPA’s Section 101 policy have been read out of the Act as it has
transformed into a procedural exercise.269 But the environmental impact statement
remained largely unchallenged. This changed in the Trump administration; and
regardless of what the Biden administration is able to undo, as with so many norms
and practices that were crossed, it is now likelier that future challenges to the
meaning of “detailed statements” and the legislative intent behind Section 102 will
be on the horizon.
In this Article, we applied the traditional canons of legislative histories and found
that these classic tools did not fare very well in pointing to the actual history of
Section 102. In many ways, in fact, these tools misdirect. The use of positive canons
is better suited for the interpretation of NEPA’s EIS. In the face of future challenges
to Section 102, reliance on traditional canons will lead a court astray from an accurate
understanding of NEPA’s most important provision. In their place, we urge the use
of positive canons, which reveal a detailed and conflict-oriented history and which
best defend a rigorous environmental impact statement, one of environmental law’s
most important protections.270

269. See supra note 37.
270. Despite Jackson’s use of the term “action-forcing,” the Interior Committee view of
the EIS was that findings would be short, largely perfunctory, and without meaningful
consideration of alternatives. Institutional reform would come through consideration of
Section 101 and judicial intervention. Muskie’s view, on the other hand, was that independent
of a policy statement, agencies needed their behavior changed by forced, significant
statements. See supra Section II.B.

